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ABSTRACT 
 
The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Un-
ion (Brexit) is not only a source of political and legal upheaval in 
Europe but will also prompt a recalibration of transatlantic treaty 
relations.  This Article argues that it is a gross oversimplification to 
conceive of the latter as sets of old and new bilateral relationships.  
Instead, Brexit affects many existing and interdependent triangular 
relationships that the United States maintains with the EU and its 
Member States, which are conditioned also by the foreign relations 
laws of these polities.  Perhaps counterintuitively, recalibration in 
the “high politics” area of security and defense will be easier than 
in the “low politics” of trade and regulation.  In elaborating on 
these arguments, this Article delves into three levels of complexity: 
First, the empirical challenge of determining the treaties in force 
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between the EU and United States and by which the UK will cease 
to be covered; second, the transatlantic implications of available al-
ternative models to EU membership for the UK; and third, the way 
forward in ensuring continuity and bringing about future agree-
ments and cooperation in the EU-UK-U.S. triangle, seeing that the 
EU itself is a moving target due to ongoing reform efforts. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the aftermath of the referendum in the United Kingdom 
(“UK”) on the country’s continued membership of the European 
Union (“EU”), Timothy Garton Ash anticipated that “[a]cres of 
newsprint and gigabytes of web space will be devoted over the 
next weeks and months to the grim mechanics of disentangling the 
UK from the EU.”1  Academic circles have not lagged behind in 
this effort.  A veritable ‘library of Brexit’ has emerged,2 including in 
legal scholarship.3 
Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, weary of negative repercus-
sions of a disorderly withdrawal, the United States (“U.S.”) gov-
ernment urged both sides to move the withdrawal process “for-
ward swiftly and without unnecessary acrimony.”4  The U.S. does 
so with good reasons.  There is a pressing need for a better and 
more complete understanding of the impact of Brexit on the U.S. 
                                                   
1  Timothy Garton Ash, As an English European, This Is the Biggest Defeat of My 
Political Life, GUARDIAN (June 24, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/commentisfree/2016/jun/24/lifelong-
english-european-the-biggest-defeat-of-my-political-life-timothy-garton-ash-
brexit [https://perma.cc/RM52-KZ3E]. 
2  See generally GEOFFREY EVANS & ANAND MENON, BREXIT AND BRITISH POLITICS 
(2017) (exploring how the changing nature of British politics and the lasting evo-
lution of Britain’s relations with the EU shaped the outcome of the referendum 
and what that outcome itself might mean for the future form of UK politics); 
HAROLD D. CLARKE ET AL., BREXIT: WHY BRITAIN VOTED TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (2017) (drawing upon ten years of survey data to explain why a majority of 
UK voters decided to ignore the national and international community and vote 
for Brexit); LEE MCGOWAN, PREPARING FOR BREXIT: ACTORS, NEGOTIATIONS AND 
CONSEQUENCES (2018) (contextualizing Brexit’s negotiation process by analyzing 
the internal regional dimension with a specific focus on Northern Ireland). 
3  See generally THE LAW & POLITICS OF BREXIT (Federico Fabbrini ed., 2017) 
(discussing the constitutional implications of Brexit for the UK and EU); THE UK 
AFTER BREXIT: LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES (Michael Dougan ed., 2017) (analyz-
ing the effects of de-Europeanisation on the UK legal system); KENNETH A. 
ARMSTRONG, BREXIT TIME: LEAVING THE EU – WHY, HOW AND WHEN? (2017) 
(providing an objective presentation of data and arguments to track decisions that 
shaped Brexit up to the point of the UK’s notification of its intention to withdraw 
from the EU); GETTING TO BREXIT: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PROCESS OF THE UK’S 
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EU (Jennifer A. Hillman & Gary Horlick eds., 2017) 
(providing an overview of salient legal issues raised by the UK’s decision to with-
draw from the EU, with a particular focus on international trade). 
4  See U.S. Sec’y of State Rex W. Tillerson, The U.S. and Europe: Strengthen-
ing Western Alliances, (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson/remarks/2017/11/276002.h
tm [https://perma.cc/H25B-HURY] (discussing then current foreign policy issues 
for the U.S., such as its relationships with the EU and UK). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2
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and its relations with the EU and the UK.  A number of the ties that 
link the two sides of the Atlantic in the form of international 
agreements risk being untangled, as the UK will no longer be cov-
ered by agreements concluded by the EU.  Moreover, as the UK 
will no longer be on the inside of EU foreign policy, new transat-
lantic agreements that cover the U.S., the EU, and the UK will be-
come more difficult to achieve. 
In the face of this challenge, this Article puts the focus on the 
transatlantic dimension of Brexit; more precisely, it investigates 
how the treaty relations that the U.S. entertains with the EU and 
the UK will be affected.  In doing so, the Article delves into three 
levels of analysis and develops a two-pronged argument.  The first 
level of analysis concerns a legal-empirical problem, i.e., treaty law 
as it currently stands between the U.S., EU and UK.  The second 
level concerns the transatlantic implications and trade-offs of the 
different models for post-Brexit UK-EU relations.  Lastly, the third 
level concerns the way forward, i.e., ensuring continuity of existing 
agreements and the shifting parameters for future ones.  Hence, the 
Article not only provides analysis for what Garton Ash called the 
“grim mechanics”5 of disentanglement.  It also addresses future re-
engagement to shed light on the prospects of a “kinder, gentler 
Brexit”6 in a wider transatlantic context, both in the immediate af-
termath of withdrawal as well as in the longer term. 
Throughout these three levels, the first prong of the argument 
put forward here is that it would be a gross oversimplification to 
conceive of transatlantic relations as a set of old and new bilateral 
relationships governed by public international law only.  Instead, 
they need to be conceived as both multilevel and triangular.  They 
are multilevel because these relationships are conditioned also by 
the domestic laws of the U.S., the UK, and the EU and its remain-
ing Member States.  For instance, a future U.S.-UK trade agreement 
will be contingent upon both what international law allows and the 
ability to meet constitutional hurdles within each country to con-
clude and ratify such an agreement as a deal.  Consequently, the 
various recalibration exercises prompted by Brexit are as much 
considerations of international (treaty) law as they are “compara-
                                                   
5  Ash, supra note 1. 
6  See Joseph H. H. Weiler, Editorial: The Case for a Kinder, Gentler Brexit, 28 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–4 (2017) (rebutting policy rationale in support of the EU’s belli-
cosity towards a post-Brexit UK, arguing instead that it would be in the Union’s 
best interest to extend the same privileges accorded to third parties).  
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tive foreign relations law”7 in action.  From this realization flows 
also the need to understand these relationships as triangular.  In 
economic terms, the transatlantic space has already been aptly de-
scribed as a “stool” with “three legs.”8  This triangular relationship 
is equally present in the legal sphere.  This applies to the con-
straints that both EU membership puts on Member States’ bilateral 
relations with the U.S. as well as the constraints it puts on non-EU 
members that maintain various forms of close association with the 
EU. 
The second prong of the Article’s argument posits different 
levels of difficulty that the U.S., UK and EU will face in this exer-
cise of “transatlantic trigonometry,” which will depend on the sub-
ject matter.  Ensuring continuity and crafting new forms of cooper-
ation in the future will be easier in the “high politics” area of 
security and defense than in the “low politics” of trade and regula-
tion.  This relative ease is due to the lower level of integration in 
the former, which makes disentanglement and reengagement a 
more straightforward task.  In the latter, the trade-offs are more 
readily apparent, which often make tough choices unavoidable. 
In order to elaborate on these points, the Article proceeds as 
follows: Section 2 briefly retraces the steps leading to the current 
situation and summarizes the state of the political and scholarly 
discourse.  Section 3 tackles the empirical challenge of determining 
the state of U.S.-EU treaty relations that will be affected by Brexit 
and reveals the existence of a multitude of triangular transatlantic 
relationships.  Section 4 focuses on the transatlantic implications of 
existing alternative modes of association with the EU, which could 
serve as models—or at least points of departure—for the UK post-
Brexit.  Turning to the way forward, Section 5 addresses the ongo-
ing reforms within the EU, which make it a moving target, and the 
“new transatlantic trigonometry” between it, the UK and the U.S. 
in terms of ensuring continuity of existing treaty relationships and 
setting the parameters for new agreements to be explored.  Section 
                                                   
7  See Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Relations Law as a Field of Study, 111 AJIL 
UNBOUND 316, 320 (2017), expanded version reprinted in Curtis A. Bradley, What is 
Foreign Relations Law?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW (Curtis A. Bradley ed., forthcoming 2018) (observing how federal-
ism and a country’s foreign relations law are increasingly recognized as playing 
an important role in international affairs). 
8  See DANIEL S. HAMILTON & JOSEPH P. QUINLAN, THE TRANSATLANTIC 
ECONOMY 2017: ANNUAL SURVEY OF JOBS, TRADE AND INVESTMENT BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 2 (2017) (describing the UK, EU, and U.S. as three legs 
of a stool given their extensive economic relationships). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2
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6 summarizes the Article’s findings. 
 
2.  HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
 
To most non-European observers, the political spectacle that is 
the Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU must seem 
strange if not utterly bizarre.  Hence, it is appropriate to first re-
trace the steps leading up to Brexit.  In order to set the scene, this 
Section starts in the more distant past (2.1.), then provides an over-
view of more recent events (2.2.), and culminates in the current 
state of negotiations and academic discourse, which exhibits an in-
creasing realization of the external relations aspects of Brexit (2.3.). 
 
2.1.  Antecedents of an Uneasy Relationship 
 
For most of their history, the UK and the EU had an uneasy re-
lationship.  As the European Parliament’s Brexit coordinator Guy 
Verhofstadt noted in April 2017: “perhaps it was never meant to 
be.”9  This may hark back to Winston Churchill’s observation in 
1930 that Britain was “with Europe but not of it.”10  Churchill re-
stated this sentiment in his famous speech made in Zurich in 1946 
calling for a “United States of Europe,” of which the Brits should 
be “friends and sponsors”11 rather than members. 
Yet, today the UK can look back on four decades of member-
ship in the EU (and its predecessors).  The UK was not a founding 
member of the original integration organizations:  the European 
                                                   
9  EUR. PARL. DEB. (RC-B8-0237) 6 (Apr. 5, 2017) (remarks of Mr. Verhofstadt), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20170405+ITEM-
006+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-017-000 
[https://perms.cc/R7NJ-4W9X] (arguing that although Brexit was an unfortunate 
outcome of domestic politics, the relationship between the UK and Europe was 
always uneasy and perhaps “never meant to be”).  
10  See JOHN LUKACS, CHURCHILL: VISIONARY. STATESMAN. HISTORIAN 87 (2002) 
(citing Winston Churchill, SATURDAY EVENING POST, February 15, 1930) (noting 
that although Churchill supported the idea of a united Europe, he considered the 
UK to be somewhat apart). 
11  See MARTIN GILBERT, CHURCHILL AND AMERICA 380 (2005) (citing Winston 
Churchill, Speech in Zurich (September 19, 1946) (on file with BBC Written Ar-
chives Centre) (describing Churchill’s expressed support for a more united Eu-
rope).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
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Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity, and the European Economic Community (“EEC”).  It first 
tried to join in 1961 under Prime Minister Macmillan, but was de-
nied due to French opposition, in particular from President Charles 
de Gaulle.12  A second attempt in 1967 under Prime Minister Wil-
son also failed.13  Eventually, in 1972 the Treaty of Accession was 
signed, which paved the way for the UK, joined by Ireland and 
Denmark, to become EEC members on January 1, 1973.14 
Ever since, the UK has come to be seen as an “awkward”15 and 
“reluctant partner.”16  Only two years after the UK joined the EEC, 
a first referendum was held in the UK on the country’s continued 
membership of the bloc.  In this original “Brexit” referendum, the 
“remain” camp prevailed.17  Subsequently, to name only the most 
prominent sources of this awkward relationship, the UK demand-
ed a special “rebate” in terms of its contributions to the EU’s budg-
et,18 a permanent opt-out from the common currency,19 an opt-out 
from justice and home affairs policies (though subsequently largely 
retracted through opting back into specific measures),20 and re-
                                                   
12  See ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 12–13 (providing the history of the UK’s 
applications to join the EEC). 
13  See id. at 13–14 (explaining Member States’ position on UK membership 
and the reasons for opposition by France). 
14  Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, Jan. 22, 
1972, 1972 O.J. (L 73) 5. 
15  See generally STEPHEN GEORGE, AN AWKWARD PARTNER: BRITAIN IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (3d ed., 1998) (explaining the history and context of the 
UK’s membership of the “European Communities” and how the UK, even as a 
member, continued to have an awkward relationship due to various circumstanc-
es). 
16  See Finn Laursen et al., The Institutional Dynamics of Euro-Atlantic Integra-
tion, in THE GEOPOLITICS OF EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION 39, 44 (Anders Wivel & 
Hans Mouritzen eds., 2005) (observing that the UK has not established itself as an 
EU leader due to being a “reluctant partner” by opting out of several elements of 
EU membership such as a common currency and Schengen cooperation).  
17  See STEPHEN WALL, THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY, VOLUME II: FROM REJECTION TO REFERENDUM, 1963–1975 511–90 (2013) 
(providing a history of the events leading up to and result of the UK referendum 
on its European Communities membership in 1975). 
18  See DAVID GOWLAND, BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 219–30 (2017) 
(discussing the history and resolution of the controversy surrounding UK contri-
butions to the EU budget). 
19  See id. at 133–34 (describing the UK’s opting-out of various EU agree-
ments, including the common currency). 
20  See Protocol (No 21) On the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in 
respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 295 (provid-
ing the opt-out with an option for subsequent opt-in scheme).  See also STEVE 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2
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fused to join the Schengen zone of passport-free travel.21 
At the same time, the UK has been instrumental in the devel-
opment of the EU’s internal market and saw itself as a leader of EU 
(free) trade policies.22  It did not opt out of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy when it was launched with the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992, but “played a central role”23 in its development and 
even became a crucial factor in breathing life into the European Se-
curity and Defence Policy (now known as the Common Security 
and Defence Policy, “CSDP”) with the pivotal joint Franco-British 
St. Malo Declaration of 1998.24  Hence, despite the UK’s uneasy re-
lationship with the EU and strong Eurosceptic sentiment,25 the 
EU’s external policies such as trade, but also security and defense, 
tended to be less controversial, at least among the UK political 
leadership. 
 
2.2.  The Brexit Referendum, Notification, and Withdrawal 
 
The question of the UK’s continued EU membership came to a 
head when Prime Minister Cameron, based on an election manifes-
                                                                                                                   
PEERS, EU JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS LAW, VOLUME II: EU CRIMINAL LAW, POLICING, 
AND CIVIL LAW 41–42 (4th ed., 2016).  
21  See Protocol (No 19) On the Schengen Acquis Integrated into the Frame-
work of the European Union, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 290 (providing the opt-out, which 
applied to Ireland as well, and with which the UK maintains a common travel ar-
ea). 
22  See Catherine Barnard, Brexit and the EU Internal Market, in THE LAW & 
POLITICS OF BREXIT 201, 201 (Federico Fabbrini ed., 2017) (noting that the “UK has 
been a champion of the single market”); see also Prime Minister David Cameron, 
EU speech at Bloomberg (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg 
[https://perma.cc/3K69-PB22] (“Britain is at the heart of that Single Market, and 
must remain so … I want us to be at the forefront of transformative trade deals 
with the US, Japan and India as part of the drive towards global free trade.”). 
23  See Laursen et al., supra note 16, at 44 (“Only in the development of the 
CFSP has the UK played a central role.”). 
24  See Alistair J.K. Shepherd, Blair, Brown and Brussels: The European Turn in 
British Defence Policy, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY: BLAIR, 
BROWN AND BEYOND 39, 43 (David Brown ed., 2010) (describing the drivers and 
importance of the St. Malo Declaration of 1998 with respect to the UK’s integra-
tion with Europe). 
25   See Chris Gifford & Karine Tournier-Sol, Introduction: The Structure of Brit-
ish Euroscepticism, in THE UK CHALLENGE TO EUROPEANIZATION: THE PERSISTENCE OF 
BRITISH EUROSCEPTICISM 1, 1 (Karine Tournier-Sol & Chris Gifford eds., 2015) (ar-
guing that “a powerful and persistent Euroscepticism remains entrenched in UK 
political institution and public culture.”).  
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to commitment,26 promised in his 2013 Bloomberg speech to hold 
an in-out referendum following a renegotiation of the UK’s status 
within the EU.27  The new settlement was agreed upon in February 
2016.  It would preserve the UK’s status of open-ended non-
participation in the euro, provide an interpretation of the “ever 
closer union”28 principle so it could not be used for expanding the 
EU’s powers further, strengthen the role of national parliaments, 
and bring about additional safeguards to inhibit migrants from 
other EU countries from drawing social security and child bene-
fits.29 
 Following a referendum campaign best described as acrimoni-
ous, alarmist, and deceiving,30 on June 23, 2016, with 17.4 million 
votes in favor of leaving and 16.1 million in favor of remaining,31 
“the UK had voted to leave the EU.”32  This outcome resulted in the 
resignation of Cameron, who was succeeded by Theresa May after 
an internal contest within the British Conservative Party.33 
The question arose whether the Westminster Parliament would 
need to give its consent to the government in order to deliver the 
official withdrawal notification letter to the European Council, 
known as “triggering” Article 50 of the Treaty on European Un-
                                                   
26  See ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 42 (discussing the logic behind the Con-
servative Party’s making the election manifesto in terms of obtaining a positive 
election result and wanted reforms to its EU membership). 
27  Cameron, supra note 22.  See also ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 25 (describ-
ing the tension in the Conservative Party over offering a referendum and David 
Cameron’s ultimate “bow[ing] to pressure” to agree to it). 
28  See Treaty on European Union art. 1, ¶ 2, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 [hereinafter 
TEU] (stipulating this idea of a closer union in the thirteenth recital of the pream-
ble as well); see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 1 [hereinafter TFEU] (stipulating a closer union 
in the first recital of the preamble).  
29  See A New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union, Ex-
tract of the Conclusions of the European Council of 18–19 February 2016, 2016 O.J. 
(C 69) I/1 (recording the decisions made by the European Council to address the 
UK’s concerns over EU membership if the UK were to vote to remain); see also 
ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 30–35 (outlining various areas for which the UK 
sought reforms with respect to its EU membership). 
30  See ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 65–69 (describing the tensions between the 
Leave and Remain campaigns, including examples of posters suggested by some 
to have “incited racial hatred,” of information quality described as “post-truth,” 
and of fear-mongering by both sides). 
31  Id. at 69. 
32  Id. 
33  See id. at 141 (discussing the “leadership gap” and “policy vacuum” fol-
lowing the result and Cameron’s subsequent resignation). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2
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ion.34  In the Miller judgment of January 24, 2017, the UK Supreme 
Court ruled that such consent was indeed necessary given the spe-
cial nature of the EU law within the UK legal system.35  Conse-
quently, based on a parliamentary majority, Royal Assent was giv-
en to the “European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017” 
on March 16, 2017.36  
On March 29, 2017, the UK government delivered the notifica-
tion to the European Council.37  This started the clock for a two-
year negotiation period to conclude a withdrawal agreement be-
fore the UK would cease to be an EU member.38  It is disputed 
whether the UK’s notification could be revoked unilaterally by the 
British government and Brexit thus be reversed, though some legal 
scholars argue that this would be permissible.39  An extension of 
the two-year period provided for Article 50 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (“TEU”) is possible, but requires the unanimous deci-
sion of the European Council and the withdrawing Member State.40 
Following the notification, negotiations between the UK and 
the EU commenced.  Based on a “sequenced” approach starting 
                                                   
34  See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 50, ¶ 1 (“Any Member State may decide to 
withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional require-
ments.”). 
35  See R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v. Secretary 
of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant), [2017] UKSC 5, ¶ 101 (appeal 
taken from N. Ir.) (concluding that UK parliamentary approval was required in 
order to give notice to leave the EU given the terms and effect of the European 
Communities Act of 1972). 
36  European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, c.9 (UK). 
37  Letter from Theresa May, Prime Minister, U.K., to Donald Tusk, President, 
European Council (Mar. 29, 2017). 
38  See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 50, ¶ 3 (stating the EU “Treaties shall cease 
to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdraw-
al agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification” to withdraw was is-
sued, “unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State con-
cerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.”); see also Federico Fabbrini, 
Introduction, in THE LAW & POLITICS OF BREXIT 1, 7–10 (Federico Fabbrini ed., 2017) 
(discussing the details of the notification for withdrawal). 
39  See, e.g., Jens Dammann, Revoking Brexit: Can Member States Rescind Their 
Declaration of Withdrawal from the European Union, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 265, 304 
(2017) (arguing in favor of a “right to rescind” for both legal and policy reasons); 
see also Aurel Sari, Reversing a Withdrawal Notification under Article 50 TEU: Can a 
Member State Change Its Mind, 42 EUR. L. REV. 451 (Mar. 16, 2017) (discussing how 
Article 50 notification can be revoked). In Miller, supra note 35, at ¶ 26, the UK Su-
preme Court refrained from ruling on this since for the parties, for the purposes of 
the case, it was “common ground that notice under article 50(2) [TEU] … cannot 
be given in qualified or conditional terms and that, once given, it cannot be with-
drawn.”  
40  TEU, supra note 28, at art. 50, ¶ 3. 
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with the withdrawal agreement, the first phase of negotiations fo-
cused on the financial settlement, citizens’ rights, and the situation 
in Northern Ireland.  Only once these issues are addressed, negoti-
ations shall move on to the future partnership, as insisted on by the 
EU.41  In December 2017, it was declared that sufficient progress 
was reached regarding the first phase,42 meaning that negotiations 
could turn to a possible transitional arrangement and the future re-
lationship.  However, the issue of the border between the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which will become part of the 
EU’s external border after Brexit, remained a difficult subject in the 
negotiations, and is likely to continue to cause tensions for Ireland 
and the EU-UK relationship.43 
 In early 2018, the Council of the EU adopted additional direc-
tives regarding a transitional period, while the European Council 
agreed on a set of updated negotiating guidelines.44  In mid-
November 2018, the texts of a Draft Withdrawal Agreement nego-
tiated between the European Commission and the British Govern-
ment and a Political Declaration regarding the framework for the 
future relationship between the EU and the UK were published.45  
This was a mere four and a half months before the presumptive 
deadline of March 29, 2019, after which the EU Treaties would 
“cease to apply”46 to the UK.  However, these are not the only trea-
ties to be affected by Brexit. 
                                                   
41  Special meeting of the European Council (Art. 50) (29 April 2017), EUCO 
XT 20004/17. 
42  European Council (Art. 50) meeting (15 Dec. 2017), EUCO XT 20011/17. 
43  See John Doyle and Eileen Connolly, Brexit and the Northern Ireland Ques-
tion, in THE LAW & POLITICS OF BREXIT 140 (Federico Fabbrini ed., 2017) (analyzing 
the political impact of different outcomes of the Brexit negotiations on Northern 
Ireland, including those of a ‘hard border’ on the island of Ireland and the alterna-
tive of a border between Ireland and the UK running through the Irish Sea). 
44  Council of the European Union (29 Jan. 2018), Supplementary Directives 
for the Negotiation of an Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland Setting out the Arrangements for its Withdrawal from the 
European Union, XT 21004/18 ADD 1 REV 2; European Council (Art. 50) (23 Mar. 
2018), EUCO XT 20001/18. 
45  Draft Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic En-
ergy Community, as agreed at negotiators’ level, TF50 55, Nov. 14, 2018; Political 
Declaration Setting out the Framework for the Future Relationship between the 
European Union and the United Kingdom (22 Nov. 2018). 
46  TEU, supra note 28, at art. 50, ¶ 3.  
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2.3.  Academic Discourse and the External Dimension 
 
In the academic discourse, it has been increasingly recognized 
that Brexit has “two faces”, one internal and one external.47  In oth-
er words, it entails questions of both EU and national law on the 
one side,48 and international law, on the other.49  According to Arti-
cle 50 TEU, the arrangements to be made with the departing coun-
try are to take “account of the framework for its future relationship 
with the Union.”50  Therefore, the external dimension of Brexit al-
ready loomed large even before the EU concluded that there had 
been “sufficient progress” in its negotiations with the UK so as to 
move to negotiating a future trade and other agreements with the 
EU.  However, the international legal dimension goes far beyond 
the future EU-UK relationship.  According to research conducted 
by the Financial Times, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will re-
quire the renegotiation of more than 750 international agreements 
with 168 different countries, from which the UK currently benefits 
by virtue of being an EU member.51 
Moreover, when approaching Brexit from a transatlantic angle, 
U.S. foreign relations law needs to be added to the considered legal 
frameworks.  After all, neither a future U.S.-UK trade deal nor a 
revamped Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)52 
with the EU will ever see the light of day if either fails to secure the 
approval by the relevant constitutional branches under the U.S. 
Constitution.  This concerns, in particular, certain majorities in 
Congress, depending on the content of the agreement.53  Hence, 
                                                   
47  Adam Łazowski & Ramses A. Wessel, The External Dimension of Withdrawal 
from the European Union, REVUE DES AFFAIRES EUROPÉENNES 623 (Apr. 2016). 
48  See Adam Łazowski, Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to 
Membership, 37 EUR. L. REV. 523 (2012) (discussing how high levels of legal integra-
tion within the EU make it difficult to withdraw from the EU).  The British legal 
dimension was expounded in Miller, supra note 35. 
49  Jed Odermatt, Brexit and International Law: Disentangling Legal Orders, 31 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2017). 
50  TEU, supra note 28, at art. 50, ¶ 2.  
51  Paul McClean, After Brexit: the UK will need to renegotiate at least 759 treaties, 
FIN. TIMES (May 30, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/f1435a83-372b-11e7-
bce4-9023f8c0fd2e [https://perma.cc/5NZU-TAM9]. 
52  The negotiations on TTIP have been discontinued since the end of 2016, see 
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S.-EU Joint Report on T-
TIP: Progress to Date, (Jan. 17, 2017) (noting that “[b]etween July 2013 and Octo-
ber 2016, 15 Negotiating Rounds were held”, but not outlining any specific future 
steps). 
53  A two-thirds Senate majority will be needed if concluded as a “treaty” 
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Brexit’s external face is an inherently multilevel problem, involving 
national (including from non-EU members), EU, and international 
law. 
The transatlantic relationship should take pride of place in re-
searching the external dimension of Brexit for both economic and 
political reasons.  According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, the “United States and the 28 Member States of the EU 
share the largest economic relationship in the world.”54 Moreover, 
the wider strategic importance of transatlantic bonds and shared 
values needs to be stressed.55  In legal-academic circles, compelling 
cases have been made for a transatlantic perspective or vision.56  In 
this spirit, the present Article adopts a distinctly transatlantic focus 
on the external dimension of Brexit. 
Before delving into the empirical, legal, and political challenges 
that Brexit poses for transatlantic treaty relations, a preliminary 
point on the EU as an international actor should be made, especial-
ly in view of this Article’s emphasis on trade and security as sub-
stantive focus areas.  This focus is not to imply that other policy ar-
eas, such as environmental protection, are not important.  Trade 
and security serve as illustrations of what traditionally have been 
seen as respectively “low” and “high politics.”57  Moreover, they 
                                                                                                                   
(U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2), or a simple majority in both Houses if concluded as a 
“congressional-executive agreement,” covering matters falling under the enumer-
ated powers of either the President or Congress (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, and art. II, 
§ 2, respectively).  See also Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and 
Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1274–1306 
(2008) (summarizing the practice of both modes of treaty making). 
54  U.S. OFFICE OF THE TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE 
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 139 (Mar. 2017); see also HAMILTON & 
QUINLAN, supra note 8, at v (“Despite transatlantic political turbulence, the U.S. 
and Europe remain each other’s most important markets.”). 
55  Cf. SHARED VISION, COMMON ACTION: A STRONGER EUROPE, A GLOBAL 
STRATEGY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 36 (June 2016) 
(stating that “a solid transatlantic partnership through NATO and with the United 
States and Canada helps us strengthen resilience, address conflicts, and contribute 
to effective global governance.”); and NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 47 (Dec. 2017) (stating that “a strong and free Europe is of vital 
importance to the United States.  We are bound together by our shared commit-
ment to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”). 
56  A TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY OF LAW: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND US LEGAL ORDERS (Elaine Fahey & Deirdre 
Curtin eds., 2014); and LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA (Eric Stein & 
Peter Hay eds., 1967). 
57  For this distinction, see generally Stanley Hoffman, Obstinate or Obsolete? 
The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe, 95 DAEDALUS (1966) (ar-
guing that while European states were more willing to integrate in areas of “low 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2
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correspond to the two distinct modes of operation in EU foreign 
policy. 
On the one hand, this concerns EU trade policy (called the 
“Common Commercial Policy”, CCP),58 which is decidedly supra-
national.59  This supranational mode of operation is also the default 
of rules and decision-making procedures in the EU and is charac-
terized by the prominent roles played by the European Commis-
sion and the European Parliament,60 voting by “qualified majority” 
in the Council of the EU,61 according to which a minority of Mem-
ber States can be outvoted, and jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU).62 
On the other hand, this concerns the Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy (CFSP), which is decidedly intergovernmental.63  It 
represents a delimited policy field with its own “specific rules and 
procedures.”64  The latter is designed to sideline the supranational 
institutions and guarantee that the Member States remain free to 
act internationally.65  Other external policies fall between this spec-
trum of “bipolarity.”66  As a matter of foreign relations law, i.e., 
understanding how the EU operates internally when engaging the 
                                                                                                                   
politics” such as trade, in the “high politics” of foreign and security policy they 
carefully guarded their national sovereignty); see also Stanley Hoffman, Reflections 
on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today, 21 J. COMMON MKT. ST. 21, 29 (1982) 
(acknowledging the difficulty to clearly delimiting “low” and “high” politics and 
proposing instead a distinction between politics of “strict reciprocity” and politics 
which aims “for the maximization of the common good”). 
58  TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 207, ¶ 1. 
59  GABRIEL SILES-BRÜGGE, CONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN UNION TRADE POLICY: A 
GLOBAL IDEA OF EUROPE 9 (2014). 
60  TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 294 (detailing what is now known as the “ordi-
nary legislative procedure”). 
61  Id., art. 238, ¶ 3 (defining a qualified majority). 
62  See id., at art. 263 (on review powers in actions for annulment of legislative 
and certain other acts) and id., arts. 258–60 (on infringements proceedings against 
the Member States). 
63  STEPHAN KEUKELEIRE & TOM DELREUX, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 63 (2d ed. 2014). 
64  TEU, supra note 28, at art 24, ¶ 1.  
65  KEUKELEIRE & DELREUX, supra note 63, at 72 (noting that “the Commission 
is largely sidelined in the CFSP and CSDP”). 
66  Alan Dashwood, The Continuing Bipolarity of EU External Action, in THE 
EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARC MARESCEAU 3, 3 (Inge 
Govaere et al. eds., 2014).  For instance, the EU’s development policy does not 
have its own “specific rules and procedures.”  However, the EU Treaties make 
clear that the Member States retain their own national development policies.  
TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 4, ¶ 4. 
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world in general and the United States in particular,67 it is crucial 
to keep the existence of these different modes in mind, something 
that is rather alien to the American system of foreign relations 
law.68  From an American legal perspective, the CFSP might be best 
explained as an additional layer of “exceptionalism” within the 
general exceptionalism pertaining to foreign relations.69  This dis-
tinction is crucial for the second prong of the Article’s argument:  
resolving Brexit and piecing back together the transatlantic triangle 
will be easier in the area of “high politics” of sovereignty-sensitive 
areas such as security and defense than in the allegedly “low poli-
tics” of trade and regulation, due not in the least to its intergov-
ernmental character and lack of deep integration. 
 
3.  PRE-BREXIT AND THE TWENTY-EIGHT TRANSATLANTIC TRIANGLES 
 
Political discourse likes to simplify transatlantic relations 
through the use of binary imagery.  Prominent examples of this in-
clude the idea of the “two pillars,”70 a “transatlantic bargain” of 
providing security in exchange for economic integration,71 “the 
sword and shield”,72 or a phone line with America on one end and 
                                                   
67  Bradley, supra note 7, at 316 n.1 (noting that the “European Union, as a su-
pranational institution that in some ways resembles a nation, also has a developed 
body of foreign relations law.”); see also Joris Larik, EU Foreign Relations Law as a 
Field of Scholarship, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 321 (2017) (discussing the development of 
EU foreign relations law and predicting that it will become a “pillar and im-
portant driver” of foreign relations legal scholarship). 
68  While different degrees of deference apply to different contexts, no radi-
cally different sets of constitutional rules and procedures apply depending on the 
policy area; see Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Relations Law and the Purported Shift 
Away From “Exceptionalism”, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 294, 300 (2015) (examining the 
degrees of deference given by the U.S. Supreme Court to the Bush Administra-
tion’s interpretation of treaties). 
69  Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1089, 1096 (1999) (describing exceptionalism as “the view that the federal gov-
ernment’s foreign affairs powers are subject to a different, and generally more re-
laxed, set of constitutional restraints than those that govern its domestic powers”). 
70  See Joris Larik, Kennedy’s “Two Pillars” Revisited: Does the ESDP Make the 
EU and the USA Equal Partners in NATO?, 14 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 289, 290–91 
(2009) (describing the EU and the U.S. as the “two pillars” of NATO). 
71  STANLEY R. SLOAN, NATO, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE ATLANTIC 
COMMUNITY: THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN CHALLENGED 1 (2d ed., 2005).  
72  The “shield” denotes European conventional forces deployed against the 
Warsaw Pact, while the “sword” represents U.S. nuclear forces.  See Kori N. 
Schake, NATO Strategy and the German-American Relationship, in THE UNITED STATES 
AND GERMANY IN THE ERA OF THE COLD WAR, 1945–1990, A HANDBOOK, VOLUME I: 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2
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Europe on the other end.73  In reality, however, these relationships 
are more complex.  Legally speaking, the relations that the United 
States entertains with the EU and its Member States can be best 
understood as a set of triangles, hence making transatlantic rela-
tions and their recalibration due to Brexit an exercise of legal ‘trig-
onometry.’ 
To visualize these triangles, one could imagine the following: 
one line connects Washington, D.C., and Brussels, the “capital” of 
the European Union where most of its key organs are situated.  
This line represents the bilateral relations between the U.S. and the 
EU as a legal person.  Moreover, 28 lines extend from Washington, 
D.C., into each of the EU Member States’ capitals, representing the 
legal relationships between the U.S. and the Member States as sov-
ereign entities.  In addition, 28 lines extend from Brussels to each 
Member State capital.74  These signify that the EU Member States 
have pooled important and extensive powers at the EU level,75 
which affects their ability to act on the international plane.76  This 
latter aspect constitutes a special link since it is not one governed 
by public international law but by EU law, which enjoys “primacy” 
over national law (what American lawyers may call “supremacy”) 
and under certain circumstances can be directly invoked by indi-
viduals and enforced by Member State courts (what EU lawyers 
call “direct effect”)—those being the hallmarks of the EU as a su-
pranational legal order distinct from both international and na-
tional law.77  
                                                                                                                   
1945–1968 233, 236 (Detlef Junker ed., 2011) (discussing the sometimes uneasy re-
lationship between European and U.S. approaches to defense during the Cold 
War). 
73  David Brunnstrom, EU Says it has Solved the Kissinger Question, REUTERS 
(Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-president-kissinger-
idUSTRE5AJ00B20091120 [https://perma.cc/YA5W-8AV8].  
74  Geometrically speaking, in the case of Belgium it would be a very flat tri-
angle given that two of its points are located in Brussels, being the capital of Bel-
gium and the seat of most of the EU’s main institutions. 
75  For the EU’s catalogue of powers (“competences”), see TFEU, supra note 
28, at arts. 3–6 (establishing the different types of European Union competence for 
different policy areas). 
76  For a detailed analysis, see Marise Cremona, External Relations and External 
Competence of the European Union: The Emergence of an Integrated Policy, in THE 
EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 217 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 2d ed., 2011) (ex-
amining the development of the European Union and the relationship between its 
internal and external dimensions). 
77  As noted by the CJEU in Opinion 1/91 (EEA), 1991 E.C.R. I-06079, ¶ 21 
(“In contrast, the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international 
agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community 
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These different legal triangles are the basic ingredients of the 
transatlantic legal relationship.  It is important to recognize that 
even when a relationship looks one-dimensional on the surface, it 
is nonetheless triangular.  For instance, a bilateral treaty between 
Ireland and the U.S. has to take into account Ireland’s obligations 
as an EU Member State.  Vice versa, a bilateral agreement between 
the U.S. and the EU will have to conform to the division of compe-
tences between the Union and Member States and will need to re-
spect the “constitutional” identity of the Member States as a core 
constitutional principle of EU law.78  Lastly, “mixed” relationships 
are more obviously triangular, since this concerns agreements that 
involve both the EU and the Member States as parties.  Such 
“mixed agreements” are concluded between a third party “of the 
one part,” and the EU and its Member States “of the other.”79  
Hence, these agreements are not among the Member States or be-
tween the Member States and the EU.  Instead, these relationships 
remain governed by EU law, in which international agreements 
rank below the EU Treaties, considered by the Court of Justice of 
the EU as the Union’s “constitutional charter.”80  In addition, there 
are multilateral settings in which both the U.S. and the EU and/or 
its Member States are present.  These also create transatlantic legal 
triangles, albeit as part of a wider and denser web of international 
legal relationships. 
The following three sub-sections present these different rela-
                                                                                                                   
based on the rule of law … The essential characteristics of the Community legal 
order which has thus been established are in particular its primacy over the law of 
the Member States and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are 
applicable to their nationals and to the Member States themselves.”).  See also 
Joined Cases C-402/05 P & 415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council 
& Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351, ¶ 285 [hereinafter Kadi v. Council] (“[T]he obliga-
tions imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing 
the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty …”).  For a critique that likens the 
EU to the U.S. in its approach to the rank of international law within the domestic 
legal order, see Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International 
Legal Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L. REV. 1, 49 (2010) (examining the response 
of European courts to the U.N. Security Council’s anti-terrorist sanctions regime). 
78  TEU, supra note 28, at art. 4, ¶ 2.  See Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan 
Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon 
Treaty, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1417 (2011) (proposing that article 4, paragraph 2, 
of the Treaty on European Union strengthens Member States’ constitutional iden-
tity against EU law). 
79  See, e.g., Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and 
GPS Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications, pmbl., June 26, 
2004, U.N.T.S. 52728. 
80  Kadi v. Council, supra note 77, at ¶ 281. 
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tionships as they stand pre-Brexit with data on the status of treaty 
relations as of August 14, 2018.  As a preliminary matter, the meth-
odology for establishing the current extent of treaty relations be-
tween the EU and U.S. is explained, which is an exercise less 
straightforward than one might expect (3.1.).  Subsequently, the 
content of these treaty relations is outlined from the EU’s perspec-
tive (3.2.), as well as from the Member States’ perspective (3.3.).  
They serve as the basis—the status quo ante Brexit, if you will—that 
provides the base line for what needs to be recalibrated. 
 
3.1.  The Trouble of Counting Treaties 
 
A logical way to begin a discussion of transatlantic treaty rela-
tions would be to state the number of agreements actually in force 
between the EU and U.S., and which the UK will cease to be cov-
ered by post-Brexit.  However, this number remains far from clear 
due to discrepancies in official and authoritative accounts.  This 
empirical challenge, hence, merits some preliminary observations 
on how to identify the relevant treaties. 
In order to determine more precisely the EU-U.S. relationship, 
three authoritative sources exist, i.e., the U.S. State Depart-
ment’s Treaties in Force 2018,81 the EU’s Treaty Office Database,82 
and the Brexit treaty renegotiation checklist compiled by the Financial 
Times.83  A closer look at them reveals that their numbers do not 
match up.  Hence, there is not even a consensus as to the number 
of treaties between the U.S. and EU in force, which is an important 
preliminary for delving into the recalibration of relations prompted 
by Brexit. 
In terms of bilateral treaties, the U.S. State Department lists 32 
agreements in force between the EU and U.S.84  According to the 
                                                   
81  U.S. Dep’t of St., Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International 
Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2018, (January 1, 2018) 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/282222.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S29S-YBXC] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018). 
82  Eur. External Action Serv., EU Treaty Office Database, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do 
[https://perma.cc/9G9Q-BV2Q] (last updated Sept. 3, 2018). 
83  Paul McClean et al., The Brexit Treaty Renegotiation Checklist, FIN. TIMES 
(Aug. 20, 2017), https://ig.ft.com/brexit-treaty-database/ 
[https://perma.cc/HA8Y-MSD2].  
84  See U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 146–47 (referring to entries under the 
heading “European Union”, and not the European Atomic Energy Community 
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EU’s Treaty Office Database, the number is 54,85 and according to 
the FT, it is 37.86  This excludes treaties pending ratification or 
those which are being provisionally applied, as well as the many 
administrative agreements concluded directly between U.S. and 
EU agencies.87 
Three main reasons for this divergence can be identified:  tim-
ing, consolidation (counting extensions and amendments), and in-
clusion of different sets of “soft” agreements.  While the first two 
are methodological differences, the third one seems arbitrary from 
a legal point of view.  
In terms of timing, Treaties in Force lists all treaties the U.S. con-
siders to be in force at a particular point in time.  In the current edi-
tion, this is January 1, 2018.  Consequently, the U.S. list does not in-
clude agreements that entered into force after that date.88  Hence, 
the Bilateral Agreement between the European Union and the 
United States of America on Prudential Measures Regarding In-
surance and Reinsurance, which entered into force on April 4, 
2018, is absent from the 2018 version of Treaties in Force.  In addi-
tion, the latter source includes only those treaties that “had not ex-
pired by their own terms, been denounced by the parties, replaced 
or superseded by other agreements, or otherwise definitely termi-
nated” by that date.89  By contrast, the EU Treaty Office lists all 
agreements that entered into force at some point in the past, in-
cluding those that are no longer in force.  This concerns six agree-
ments of the 54 listed by the EU, including the 2004 Agreement on 
the processing and transfer of passenger name records data by air 
carriers,90 which was declared incompatible with the EU Treaties 
                                                                                                                   
(Euratom) or any of the Union’s agencies, which are listed separately). 
85  Id.  Using as search parameters “Bilateral,” “Entered into Force,” and 
“United States” in its “Advanced Search” mode.  
86  McClean et. al, supra note 83.  
87  See Peter Chase & Jacques Pelkmans, This Time it’s Different: Turbo-
Charging Regulatory Cooperation, in RULE-MAKERS OR RULE-TAKERS: EXPLORING THE 
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 17, 55–60 (Daniel Hamilton & 
Jacques Pelkmans eds., 2015) (overviewing such agreements in a useful tabular 
form).  
88  U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at i. 
89  Id. 
90  See Council Decision 2004/496 of May 28, 2004 on the conclusion of an 
Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America 
on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States De-
partment of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2004 
O.J. (L 183) 83 (including the text of the 2004 Agreement).  
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by the CJEU for fundamental rights concerns (privacy),91 subse-
quently denounced by the Council,92 and ultimately replaced by an 
agreement from 2011, which entered into force in 2012.93 
Regarding consolidation, the U.S. and EU employ different ap-
proaches to counting extensions and amendments of pre-existing 
agreements.  The State Department opts for a more “economical” 
approach by listing the main agreement, and then mentioning 
amendments and extensions as additional information as part of 
that same entry.  The EU Treaty Office Database, on its part, counts 
amendments and extensions as separate agreements.  For example, 
the EU-U.S. Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation 
from 1997, which was renewed in 2004 and renewed and amended 
in 2009, is counted as one by the Americans and as three by the Eu-
ropeans.94  From the point of view of the international law of trea-
ties the latter approach is technically correct.95  However, from a 
treaty negotiator’s perspective, it might be more useful to adhere to 
the U.S. approach of counting the consolidated, up-to-date ver-
sions of the agreements currently in force. 
Thirdly, the most important difference in terms of numbers re-
lates to the counting of “softer” agreements, such as exchanges of 
letters and memoranda of understanding.  However, there is no 
clearly discernible difference in approach, for instance with one 
                                                   
91  Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, Parliament v. Council & Comm’n, 
2006 E.C.R. I-04721. 
92  Council Communication Notice concerning the denunciation of the 
Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America 
on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States De-
partment of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2006 
O.J. (C 219) 1. 
93  Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union 
on the use and transfer of passenger name records to the United States Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, EU-U.S., Dec. 14, 2011, T.I.A.S. 12-701. 
94  U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 147. 
95  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 39, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (“A treaty may be amended by agreement be-
tween the parties.  The rules laid down in Part II [on conclusion and entry into 
force of treaties] apply to such an agreement except insofar as the treaty may oth-
erwise provide.”).  The United States has signed but not ratified the VCLT.  But see 
Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 
HARV. INT’L L. REV. 307, 314 (2007) (noting that nevertheless, “executive branch 
officials have stated on a number of occasions that they view much of the Conven-
tion as reflecting binding customary international law,” with further references).  
See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and Interna-
tional Organizations or between International Organizations, art. 39, ¶ 1, Mar. 21, 
1986 [hereinafter VCLTIO] (containing a similar provision to the VCLT, though 
not in force). 
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side being generally more generous and the other more restrictive 
in terms of what it considers worthy of being included in their re-
spective lists.  According to the preface of Treaties in Force, it “uses 
the term ‘treaty’ in the generic sense as defined in the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties,” rather than “as a matter of U.S. 
constitutional law”.96  Hence, executive and executive-
congressional agreements are not excluded from the U.S. compen-
dium on “treaties”—despite its name.  
Beyond that, it is not evident which criteria are applied by ei-
ther side.  For instance, the EU lists an exchange of letters from 
2005 relating to the method of calculation of applied duties for 
husked rice,97 while the U.S. does not.  By contrast, the U.S. in-
cludes a memorandum of understanding from 2009 on the impor-
tation of beef from animals not treated with certain growth-
promoting hormones,98 while the EU does not.  Each side includes 
a number of such “soft” agreements in its list that the other does 
not, with no legal-methodological reason readily apparent. 
Regarding the list compiled by the Financial Times, which in-
cludes 37 U.S.-EU bilateral agreements, in addition to the issues 
mentioned above, some additional observations need to be made.  
While excluding expired and superseded treaties, it also excludes 
those that the journalists and researchers from the Financial Times 
considered of “little or no relevance to the UK after Brexit,” 99 while 
including also eight European Commission implementing deci-
sions and two delegated regulations.100  The authors justify this by 
                                                   
96  U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at i.  The VCLT defines treaties as “an in-
ternational agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more re-
lated instruments and whatever its particular designation.”  VCLT, supra note 95, 
at art. 2, ¶ 1, lit. a.  The VCLTIO defines it as “an international agreement gov-
erned by international law and concluded in written form: (i) between one or 
more States and one or more international organizations; or (ii) between interna-
tional organizations.”  VCLTIO, supra note 95, at art. 2, ¶ 1, lit. a.  
97  Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European 
Community and the United States of America relating to the method of calcula-
tion of applied duties for husked rice, June 30, 2005. 
98  Memorandum of understanding regarding the importation of beef from 
animals not treated with certain growth-promoting hormones and increased du-
ties applied by the United States to certain products of the European Communi-
ties, May 13, 2009, T.I.A.S. 09–513; U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 139. 
99   McClean et. al., supra note 83. 
100  Id.; See, e.g. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/230 of 17 Feb. 
2016 (amending Implementing Decision 2014/908/EU as regards the lists of third 
countries and territories whose supervisory and regulatory requirements are con-
sidered equivalent for the purposes of the treatment of exposures according to 
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noting that these are “EU ‘equivalence’ decisions on financial ser-
vices, which provide access rights to third countries” and that 
“[t]rade partners would likely take them as a starting point in fi-
nancial services discussions with the UK after Brexit.”101  While 
these are indeed relevant acts in the transatlantic and Brexit con-
texts, they are unilateral in nature and not international agree-
ments. 
If one were to approximate the correct number of bilateral trea-
ties currently in force between the EU and U.S. by combining these 
different lists and with regard to their legal content, it would be 
around fifty.  This number takes into account only bilateral agree-
ments which are currently in force, in their “consolidated” ver-
sions, and which despite their sometimes “soft” format at least one 
side deems “hard” enough to include in their list.  This set of 
agreements represents the substantive treaty law in force between 
the EU and U.S. bilaterally, which will cease to apply to the UK af-
ter Brexit and should be the subject of official discussion to ensure 
continuity and serve as the baseline for exploring future agree-
ments.  Whether all of them need to be replicated, or whether the 
terms of the replacement treaties should change, will be a matter of 
negotiations and internal political considerations framed by do-
mestic foreign relations law. 
A discrepancy exists also when it comes to multilateral treaties.  
The EU Treaty Office Database lists 80 multilateral agreements that 
have entered into force for the EU and which the U.S. has at least 
signed, if not ratified.102  The Financial Times only lists seven multi-
lateral treaties to be renegotiated with the U.S., noting that in cases 
such as the WTO or UN, “the UK should be able to ‘plug in’ to 
these agreements with ease.”103  This is again a political assessment 
and not a legal one.  The State Department’s Treaties in Force, does 
not allow for a direct two-way comparison, as it simply lists all 
multilateral treaties in force for the U.S. on January 1, 2018, ordered 
according to subject matter but without specifying treaty parties.104  
                                                                                                                   
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
2016 O.J. (L 41) 23). 
101  McClean et. al., supra note 83. 
102  These numbers are taken from the European External Action Service, su-
pra note 82, using the markers “Multilateral”, “United States”, and “Entered into 
Force” in the “Advanced Search” form. 
103  McClean et. al., supra note 83. 
104  U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 497–555 (“Section 2: Multilateral Trea-
ties and Other Agreements”). 
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Not all of the 80 multilateral agreements from the EU’s database 
that also include the U.S. are listed in Treaties in Force.  In addition 
to the reasons for discrepancy mentioned in the bilateral context, 
another factor at play here is that the EU database includes the sig-
natories to multilateral treaties rather than only those that have rat-
ified.  This means that the EU’s list includes treaties that the U.S. 
has signed but not ratified.105  At the same time the EU Treaty Of-
fice Database excludes most of the WTO Agreements, to which the 
U.S. is a party, from a targeted search.106 
In sum, there is already a significant degree of uncertainty re-
garding the scope of what the international treaty law in force is 
between the EU and U.S. in the lead-up to the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU.  Consequently, this means also significant uncertainty 
as to the extent of what might need to be renegotiated post-Brexit 
at the empirical stage, before even getting to the legal and political 
dimension of this challenge. 
 
3.2.  The EU-U.S. Relationship 
 
Having outlined the empirical difficulties in establishing the 
number of treaties in force between the EU and U.S., the following 
paragraphs provide a categorization of different kinds of transat-
lantic treaties based on the parties involved, which also reveals the 
extent of their substance.  Starting with EU-U.S. agreements, the 
analysis subsequently addresses the issue of agreements between 
the U.S. and EU Member States. 
Both within bilateral and multilateral treaties, one must distin-
guish between “mixed” and “non-mixed” treaties, i.e., those where 
in addition to the EU, its Member States are also parties, and those 
                                                   
105  See generally World Health Org. Framework Convention on Tobacco Con-
trol, (May 21, 2003), 
http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/WHO_FCTC_english.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2SZW-R7MM]; Conference on Plenipotentiaries, Rotterdam 
Convention on the prior informed consent procedure for certain hazardous chem-
icals and pesticides in international trade, Sept. 11, 1998 U.N.T.C. 39973. 
106  Using the European External Action Service data and search parameters 
from supra note 102, for instance, neither the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 1994, nor the pluri-
lateral Agreement on Government Procurement, signed in Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 
1994, are listed.  They appear, however, when only the markers “Multilateral” and 
“Entered into Force”, but not “United States” are used, even though the latter has 
ratified both agreements. 
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where only the EU is a party but not the Member States.  In con-
trast to general EU practice,107 “mixity” tends to be rare in its bilat-
eral treaty relations that do not include a wide-ranging agreement 
involving sensitive issues, especially those falling out of the EU’s 
ambit of “exclusive competences”.  A prime example of such a 
mixed agreement is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada.108  With regard to 
the U.S., such an agreement would have been TTIP.109  
Nonetheless, the EU has concluded with the U.S. a number of 
sectoral agreements in different fields.  If the EU has sufficient 
powers and the issues concerned are not viewed as highly sensitive 
by the Member States, they can agree to conclude them as EU-only 
(“non-mixed”) agreements.110  This is—perhaps counterintuitive-
ly—also the case for agreements in security and defense matters 
falling under the CFSP.  Despite their “high politics” nature, if 
there is consensus among the Member States, such agreements are 
concluded by the EU alone with a third party.111  The U.S. is no ex-
ception in that respect.  In U.S. foreign relations law, by contrast, 
‘mixity’ does not occur, despite the states’ constitutionally grant-
ed—though limited—powers to make “agreements” with “foreign 
powers.”112  
                                                   
107  Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos, Introduction, in MIXED 
AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD xix, xix 
(Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010) (“The phenomenon of mixity is 
still central to the conduct of EU external relations.”). 
108  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Cana-
da, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other 
part, EU-Can., Oct. 30, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L 11) 23 [hereinafter CETA]. 
109  FERDI DE VILLE & GABRIEL SILES-BRÜGGE, TTIP: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE 
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 7 (2016). 
110  See Case C-600/14, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council (COTIF), 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:935, ¶¶ 67–68 (clarifying the EU’s ability to conclude internation-
al agreements without the Member States as parties); see also Marise Cremona, 
Shaping EU Trade Policy post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017, 14 EUR. CONST’L L. 
REV. 231, 251 (2018).  
111  Guillaume Van der Loo & Ramses A. Wessel, The Non-Ratification of Mixed 
Agreements: Legal Consequences and Solutions, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 735, 739 
(2017) (“Perhaps ironically, an area which is not at all characterized by mixity is 
the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy …”). 
112  Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress, … enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a 
foreign Power, …”) with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into 
any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation …”).  See Robert Schütze, Federalism and 
Foreign Affairs: Mixity as an (Inter)national Phenomenon, in MIXED AGREEMENTS 
REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD 57, 62–65 (Christophe Hil-
lion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010) (summarizing the history of U.S. constitutional 
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The U.S. obviously is an important treaty partner for the EU, 
but not the largest in terms of absolute numbers.  Based on num-
bers provided by the EU Treaty Office Database (though their exact 
numbers are to be taken with a grain of salt as explained, supra 
3.1.), the EU has signed 147 agreements with the U.S.113  With Swit-
zerland, this number is 206; with Norway, it is 182.114  Thirteen of 
the 147 agreements between the U.S. and EU have not entered into 
force yet.115  About fifty of these are bilateral and currently in force 
in their consolidated versions, while approximately sixty to eighty 
multilateral ones are in force.116 
 
3.2.1.  Bilateral 
 
The bilateral agreements in force between the EU and U.S. cov-
er a wide range of sectors, including the areas of trade and securi-
ty.  In the former area, the EU and U.S. have not managed to con-
clude a comprehensive agreement.  The negotiations on TTIP, 
launched in 2013,117 have stalled and remain on hold.  Hence, trade 
relations between the U.S. and EU are largely covered by WTO 
rules (see infra 3.1.2.).  Nonetheless, there are a number of sectoral 
or specific agreements in the area of trade between the two parties.  
These are in the areas of, among others, competition118 or trade in 
hormone-treated beef as the result of a long-lasting WTO dis-
pute.119  Some are of a technical character, such as the Agreement 
                                                                                                                   
law with regard to constraining the external treaty-making powers of the States); 
see also IVAN BERNIER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM 51 (1973) (not-
ing that the “states of the American Union are not presently subjects of interna-
tional law.”). 
113  These numbers are taken from the European External Action Service, su-
pra note 82, using the markers “Bilateral” and “Multilateral,” as well as “Entered 
into Force” and “Pending” in the “Advanced Search” form. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  See DE VILLE & SILES-BRÜGGE, supra note 109, at 8–9 (summarizing the ne-
gotiation process). 
118  See U.S.-EU, June 3–4, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12958 (agreeing on the applica-
tion of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws). 
119  See Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of Ameri-
ca and the European Commission Regarding the Importation of Beef from Ani-
mals Not Treated with Certain Growth-Promoting Hormones and Increased Du-
ties Applied by the United States to Certain Products of the European 
Communities, U.S.-EU, May 13, 2009, T.I.A.S. No. 09-513. 
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on Mutual Recognition of 1998.120  The importance of such agree-
ments in the contemporary economy is not to be underestimated, 
as they “are immensely important for oiling the wheels of trade”121 
and avoiding delays and duplication in processes where possible. 
However, the U.S.-EU bilateral treaty relationship also extends 
into the area of security.  This policy domain can be further subdi-
vided into, on the one hand, international security, including sanc-
tions and operations abroad, and, on the other, homeland security, 
including cooperation between law enforcement agencies. 
In the latter area, the U.S. and the EU have engaged in treaties 
concerning, for instance, the exchange of passenger name rec-
ords122  or on financial data to combat terrorist financing.123  More-
over, there are agreements on extradition and mutual legal assis-
tance,124 as well as cooperation agreements concluded with EU 
agencies that operate in this field, such as Europol.125  An agree-
                                                   
120  See Agreement on Mutual Recognition between the European Communi-
ty and the United States of America, EU-U.S., May 18, 1998, E.T.S. No. 31 (setting 
out various specific standards to which both the U.S. and European Community 
will conform in order to facilitate trade). 
121  Marise Cremona, UK Trade Policy, in THE UK AFTER BREXIT: LEGAL AND 
POLICY CHALLENGES 247, 259 (Michael Dougan ed., 2017). 
122  Agreement between the United States of America and the European Un-
ion on the Use and Transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States De-
partment of Homeland Security, U.S.-EU, Dec. 14, 2011, T.I.A.S. No. 12-701. 
123  Agreement between the United States of America and the European Un-
ion on the Processing and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the Europe-
an Union to the United States for the Purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program, U.S.-EU, June 28, 2010, T.I.A.S. No. 10-801.  The UK, given its opt-out 
from this area of EU policy (supra 2.1), opted back into this specific agreement.  See 
Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Agreement between the European Un-
ion and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Financial 
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 2010 O.J. (L 195) 3 [herein after TFTP] (noting 
in the preamble that “the United Kingdom has notified its wish to take part in the 
adoption and application of this Decision.”). 
124  See Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and the Unit-
ed States of America, EU-U.S., pmbl., June 25, 2003, T.I.A.S. 10-201 (setting forth 
that the parties desire to cooperate on extradition in order to “combat crime in a 
more effective way as a means of protecting their respective democratic societies 
and common values”); see also Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between 
the United States of America and the European Union, U.S.-E.U., June 25, 2003, 
T.I.A.S. 10-201.1 (outlining various ways in which the parties will share infor-
mation or provide assistance for criminal prosecutions and investigations). 
125  See Agreement to Enhance Cooperation in Preventing, Detecting, Sup-
pressing, and Investigating Serious Forms of International Crime, EU-U.S., art. 1, 
Dec. 6, 2001, T.I.A.S. 01-1207 (setting forth that the EU, through Europol, and the 
U.S. will cooperate with respect to combating international crime by exchanging 
“strategic and technical information”).  Note that this agreement is not listed by 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
 
28 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 40:1 
ment which straddles the areas of internal and external security is 
about the treatment of classified information, concluded between 
the U.S. and EU in 2007.126  From the EU’s point of view, it has its 
“legal basis” in both the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
the Area of Freedom Security and Justice.127 
While the U.S. and EU have not managed to strike a deep and 
comprehensive agreement in the area of “low politics” trade, they 
did conclude a number of agreements in the area of security and 
defense—an area in which the EU’s “economic giant” tends to be 
contrasted with its being a “political dwarf” and “military 
worm.”128  As noted earlier, these agreements in the area of the 
EU’s CFSP are non-mixed, i.e., they do not include the Member 
States as parties.129 
For instance, in 2016, the U.S. and EU concluded an Acquisition 
and Cross-servicing Agreement, which has as its objective “to fur-
ther the interoperability, readiness, and effectiveness of their re-
spective Military Forces through increased logistic cooperation.”130  
According to the agreement, the EU “shall ensure that its Member 
States, directly or through Athena [the EU’s internal mechanism 
for financing common costs of military operations], reimburse the 
United States of America for all Logistic Support, Supplies, and 
Services provided by the United States of America pursuant to this 
Agreement,”131 and vice versa.132 
Moreover, in 2011, the U.S. and EU concluded a Framework 
                                                                                                                   
the U.S. State Department as having been concluded with the EU, but with the re-
spective EU agency. 
126  See Agreement between the government of the United States of America 
and the European Union on the security of classified information, U.S.-EU, Apr. 
30, 2007, T.I.A.S. 07-430.1 (establishing security measures regarding the exchange 
of classified information to further the common interest of security). 
127  See Council Decision 2007/274/JHA of 23 April 2007 concerning the con-
clusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Government of 
the United States of America on the security of classified information, pmbl., 2007 
O.J. (L 115) 29 (referring to the pre-Lisbon TEU provisions in both areas). 
128  This description is attributed to former Belgian Foreign Minister Mark 
Eyskens, made in 1991, cited by Craig R. Whitney, WAR IN THE GULF: EUROPE; 
Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans’ Fragile Unity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-gulf-
fighting-shatters-europeans-fragile-unity.html [https://perma.cc/PSN8-77R8]. 
129  See Van der Loo & Wessel, supra note 111, at 793. 
130  Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the European Union 
and the United States of America (ACSA), EU-U.S., pmbl., Dec. 6, 2016, 2016 O.J. 
(L 350) 3. 
131  Id. at art. V, ¶ 1. 
132  Id. at art. V, ¶ 2. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2
 
2018] The New Transatlantic Trigonometry 29 
Agreement on the Participation of the United States of America in 
European Union Crisis Management Operations.133  It lays down 
“general conditions” for the U.S. contributing to EU missions, “ra-
ther than defining these conditions on a case-by-case basis for each 
operation concerned.”134  However, while similar agreements with 
other countries include also the contribution of military assets,135 
this agreement is restricted to “contributions of civilian personnel, 
units, and assets by the U.S. to EU crisis management operations 
(the ‘U.S. contingent’).”136  As with other third country participat-
ing arrangements in CSDP operations, U.S. contingents would re-
main within the national chain of command,137 while at the same 
time such participation “shall be without prejudice to the decision-
making autonomy of the European Union.”138  
The framework agreement has not been made use of to date.  
Nevertheless, before the framework agreement, there was already 
an active practice of the U.S. contributing to EU operations.  Based 
on specific agreements for American participation in “EULEX 
KOSOVO,” the EU’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo,139 the U.S. 
contributed by deploying eighty police officers and eight judges 
and prosecutors.140 
                                                   
133  Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Eu-
ropean Union on the Participation of the United States of America in European 
Union Crisis Management Operations, EU-U.S., pmbl., May 17, 2011, T.I.A.S. 11-
601. 
134  Id. 
135  See Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Nor-
way Establishing a Framework for the Participation of the Kingdom of Norway in 
the European Union Crisis-Management Operations, EU-Nor., Dec. 3, 2004, 2005 
O.J. (L67) 8 (setting out the terms of Norway’s contributions to EU crisis-
management operations). 
136  Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Eu-
ropean Union, supra note 133, at art. 2, ¶ 2. 
137  Id. at art. 6, ¶ 2. 
138  Id. at art. 1, ¶ 3. 
139  See Agreement between the United States of America and the European 
Union on the Participation of the United States of America in the European Union 
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, U.S.-EU, EULEX KOSOVO, pmbl., Oct. 22, 2008, 
T.I.A.S. 08-1022 (furthering “the shared desire of the United States and the Euro-
pean Union to collaborate closely in supporting the development of Kosovo’s 
democratic standards”). 
140  See ERWAN LAGADEC, TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
EUROPE, AMERICA AND THE RISE OF THE REST 142 (2012) (describing the U.S. contri-
bution to operations); see also Thierry Tardy, CSDP: Getting Third States on Board, 
European Union Institute for Security Studies Issue Brief No. 6 (Mar. 2014), at 2 
(noting that the “United States has contributed to three operations (EULEX Koso-
vo, EUSEC RD Congo, EUPOL RD Congo), mainly by providing advisors and 
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Lastly, and as the only case of “mixity” in a bilateral agreement 
in force between the U.S. and EU, the Agreement on the Promo-
tion, Provision and Use of Galileo and Global Positioning System 
(“GPS”) Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Applica-
tions was signed in 2004 and entered into force in 2011 after ratifi-
cation by all parties.141  As a “mixed agreement,” it includes as par-
ties the U.S. on one side, and the EU and its Member States on the 
other.  The State Department’s Treaties in Force lists the agreement 
under the thematic heading “Maritime Affairs,”142 whereas for the 
EU it falls under “Trans-European Networks.”143  However, the 
agreement touches upon several policy areas.  It notes in the pre-
amble that the American GPS is “a dual use system that provides 
precision timing, navigation, and position location signals for civil 
and military purposes”144 and lists as one of the objectives of the 
agreement the desire “to promote open markets and to facilitate 
growth in trade with respect to commerce in global navigation and 
timing goods.”145  
This agreement is therefore unusual in terms of the width of its 
content.  As a result, there was a need to include the Member States 
as parties in accordance with the EU’s system of external relations 
law.  Another factor prompting its “mixed” character was pressure 
from the U.S. to clarify responsibility and liability issues.  Hence, 
the agreement stipulates:  
If it is unclear whether an obligation under this Agreement 
is within the competence of either the European Communi-
ty or its Member States, at the request of the United States, 
                                                                                                                   
personnel to assist the work of the police, prosecution and judiciary.”). 
141  See Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS 
Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications, supra note 79.  See 
also Peter M. Olson, Mixity from the Outside: The Perspective of a Treaty Partner, in 
MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD 331, 
332 (Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010) (noting that this was the 
first ever bilateral mixed agreement that the U.S. concluded). 
142  U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 146. 
143  See Council Decision of 12 December 2011 on the Conclusion of the 
Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS Satellite-
Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications between the European 
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United States of 
America, of the other part, EU-U.S., pmbl., 2011 O.J. (L 348) 1 (identifying as the 
agreement’s substantive legal basis TFEU arts. 171 and 172). 
144  Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS Sat-
ellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications, supra note 79, at first 
recital of the pmbl. 
145  Id. at eighth recital of the preamble. 
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the European Community and its Member States shall pro-
vide the necessary information.  Failure to provide this in-
formation with all due expediency or the provision of con-
tradictory information shall result in joint and several 
liability.146 
This may be due to the desire from the American side to “have 
the division of powers—and concomitant responsibility—between 
Union and Member States clearly spelled out to them”147 or, failing 
that, accept joint and several liability.148  Given this limited, and al-
ready not altogether positive experience of the U.S. with bilateral 
mixed agreements,149 further uncertainty infused by Brexit can be 
expected to create an even stronger call for legal clarity from the 
American side.  
 
3.2.2.  Multilateral 
 
In addition to bilateral treaties, the U.S. and EU are members of 
international organizations and parties to a range of multilateral 
agreements.  In multilateral settings, “mixity” is more common for 
the EU.  Nevertheless, the EU is not as well represented in interna-
tional fora and global conventions as one might expect given the 
extensive external powers the Member States have conferred upon 
it.150  This is due to the fact that certain international treaties only 
                                                   
146  Id. at art. 19, ¶ 2.  See also id. at art. 18, (designating as the parties on the 
European side “the European Community or its Member States or the European 
Community and its Member States, within their respective areas of competence”). 
147  Pieter Jan Kuijper & Esa Paasivirta, EU International Responsibility and its 
Attribution: From the Inside Looking Out, in THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 52 (Malcolm 
Evans & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2013). 
148  See Olson, supra note 141, at 343–44 (stressing that this issue was a conten-
tious point in the negotiations).  
149  Id. at 344 (noting that “[n]either side was happy with the result, however, 
nor is it clear that either would be prepared to accept a similar solution in other 
cases.”). 
150  See generally Inge Govaere et. al., In-Between Seats: The Participation of the 
European Union in International Organizations, 9 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 155 (2004) 
(discussing issues concerning the EU’s limited role in international organizations); 
Jan Wouters et. al., The EU in the World of International Organizations: Diplomatic 
Aspirations, Legal Hurdles and Political Realities, in THE DIPLOMATIC SYSTEM OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: EVOLUTION, CHANGE AND CHALLENGES 94 (Stephan Keukeleire et. 
al. eds., 2015) (noting the discrepancy between the ambitions enshrined in the EU 
Treaties after the Lisbon reform for the EU’s engagement with international or-
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allow states to become parties, which also limits the EU’s ability to 
join certain international organizations.151  Examples of cases where 
the EU would have had the internal power to conclude the agree-
ment include conventions adopted in the framework of the Inter-
national Labor Organization and the UN Charter (where it could 
appear alongside its Member States).152  In the case of the UN, the 
EU achieved “enhanced observer status” at the General Assembly 
in 2011.153  Membership, however, remains impossible. 
 There has been a trend more recently to allow “regional (eco-
nomic) integration organizations” to accede to treaties and to join 
specific international organizations.  It is by virtue of these possi-
bilities that the EU and U.S. find themselves bound in larger multi-
lateral frameworks.  Prominent examples include the WTO154 and 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Lay-
er.155  For the time being, it also includes the Paris Climate Agree-
ment,156 from which, however, the U.S. has signaled its intention to 
withdraw.157  It includes, moreover, a range of technical multilat-
                                                                                                                   
ganizations and the reality where the EU faces numerous legal and political obsta-
cles). 
151  See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 4, ¶ 1 (“Membership in the United Nations is 
open to all other peace-loving states …”); North Atlantic Treaty art. 10, Apr. 4, 
1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, 
invite any other European State …”). 
152  On the former, see Marco Ferri, Coordination Between the European Union 
and its Member States, in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 77, 78 (Christine Kaddous ed., 2015); on the latter, see 
Mariangela Zappia, The United Nations: A European Union Perspective, in THE 
EUROPEAN UNION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 25, 
27 (Christine Kaddous ed., 2015) (noting that at the UN, the EU “intervenes in all 
areas, ranging from environmental, to development, labour, telecommunications, 
humanitarian, disarmament, human rights and highly political issues”). 
153  G.A. Res. 65/276 (May 3, 2011).  
154  Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 106, at art XI, ¶ 1 (“The contracting par-
ties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and the Eu-
ropean Communities, … shall become original Members of the WTO”). 
155  Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 14, ¶ 
1, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 (“This Convention and any protocol shall be 
open for accession by States and by regional economic integration organizations 
…”). 
156  Paris Agreement, art. 20, ¶ 1, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. 16-1104 (“This 
Agreement shall be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or 
approval by States and regional economic integration organizations …”). 
157  Media Note, U.S. Dep’t of St., Communication Regarding Intent to With-
draw from Paris Agreement (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UB2S-HZSA].  According to art. 28, ¶ 1 of the Paris Agree-
ment, supra note 156, which the U.S. signed on April 22, 2016, withdrawal is pos-
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eral agreements,158 as well as in the area of commodities.159  In or-
der to illustrate the global presence and ambitions of both the U.S. 
and EU, one can point to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, of which both are parties.160 
A special case from the area of international security is the Iran 
Nuclear Deal, negotiated by the “P5+1”, which included represen-
tation from the EU and is hence sometimes rendered by the latter 
as “E3+3” (France, Germany, and the UK as EU Members, plus 
China, Russia, and the U.S.).161  The deal is not an international 
agreement for the purposes of international law, but instead was 
enshrined in the form of a “Joint Statement by EU High Repre-
sentative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad 
Zarif”162 as well as in a document published by the U.S. State De-
partment on “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program”.163  The 
                                                                                                                   
sible at the earliest three years from the date of entry into force of the agreement, 
which was on Nov. 4, 2016. 
158  See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Establishing of Global Technical 
Regulations for Wheeled Vehicles, Equipment and Parts Which can be Fitted 
and/or be Used on Wheeled Vehicles, art. 2, ¶ 1, June 25, 1998, 2119 U.N.T.S. 129 
(“regional economic integration organizations …  may become Contracting Par-
ties to this Agreement”). 
159  See, e.g., International Coffee Agreement, art. 2, ¶ 5, Sept. 28, 2007, T.I.A.S. 
11-202 (“Contracting Party means a Government, the European Community or 
any intergovernmental organization referred to in paragraph (3) of Article 4 …”). 
160  Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Feb. 24, 1976, 1025 
U.N.T.S. 297.  It entered into force for the U.S. in 2009 and for the UK and EU in 
2012, after the Treaty had been amended to allow states and regional organiza-
tions outside of Southeast Asia to join.  See Third Protocol amending the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, art. 18, ¶ 3, July 23, 2010, Cm. 8294 
(“This Treaty shall be open for accession by States outside Southeast Asia and re-
gional organisations whose members are only sovereign States subject to the con-
sent of all the States in Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom 
of Cambodia …”). 
161  See, e.g., Sebastian Harnisch, Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coali-
tion-Building: The E3/EU-3 Iran Initiative, 16 EUR. SECURITY 1 (2007) (making fre-
quent use of the “E3/EU-3” acronym). 
162  Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Ira-
nian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif Switzerland, European External Action Service 
(Apr. 2, 2015), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/3477/joint-statement-eu-high-representative-federica-mogherini-and-
iranian-foreign-minister-javad_en [https://perma.cc/P7E2-5QFK]. 
163  Media Note, U.S. Dep’t of State, Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program, (Apr. 2, 
2015),  
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/240170.htm 
[https://perma.cc/MG3R-H8ZK]. 
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framework was later specified in the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action” of July 2015.164  In May 2018, the U.S. withdrew from the 
Iran Deal,165 thus making it no longer an EU-U.S. transatlantic 
commitment. 
In the multilateral sphere, this also means that delegations of 
the U.S. and EU sit together in the organs of a number of interna-
tional organizations and at times face each other as litigants in in-
ternational disputes.  The most prominent example of the latter is 
litigation at the WTO.  The U.S. and EU are both very active liti-
gants in this forum, having faced each other in more than fifty cas-
es.166 
It should be noted that, both in the bilateral and the multilateral 
setting, the EU’s presence does not automatically entail the absence 
of its Member States.  Some of these settings are mixed.  An exam-
ple for a non-mixed multilateral setting is the Agreement on Duty-
Free Treatment of Multi-Chip Integrated Circuits (MCPs) from 
2005, which includes as parties the EU and the U.S., as well as Ja-
pan, South Korea and Taiwan (the latter in its capacity as a WTO 
member under the name “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu”).167 
A particularly intricate example of a mixed agreement is the so-
called “Open Skies” agreement.  It was signed originally in 2007 
between the U.S. on the one, and the EU and its Member States on 
the other side.168  It has not entered into force, but has been “provi-
sionally applied” since March 2008.169  Though starting out as a bi-
                                                   
164  Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, European External Action Service 
(July 14, 2015), http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-
eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M7DH-GWZT]. 
165  Mark Landler, Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 8, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-
deal.html [https://perma.cc/4YGR-WK5Z]. 
166 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, FIND DISPUTES CASES (2018), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9E8S-XGTP] (which shows that as of August 2018, the EU has 
appeared as either complainant or respondent 184 times in WTO disputes; the 
U.S. in 269 cases). 
167  Agreement on Duty-Free Treatment of Multi-Chip Integrated Circuits 
(MCPs), Nov. 28, 2005, T.I.A.S. 06-401.  
168  Air Transport Agreement, Apr. 30, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 134) 4. 
169  Decision 2007/339/EC of the Council and the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the 
Council of 25 April 2007 on the signature and provisional application of the Air 
Transport Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, 
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lateral agreement, it was subsequently “multilateralized” by virtue 
of an agreement concluded in 2011 to allow Norway and Iceland to 
accede to the arrangement.170  However, despite the additional 
non-EU parties, the agreement retains a largely bilateral structure, 
due to the fact that Norway and Iceland are “fully integrated 
members of the single European Aviation Market through the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area,”171  An institutional 
consequence of this is that within the Joint Committee set up under 
‘Open Skies,’ the position of the EU and its Member States, as well 
as that of Iceland and Norway, “shall be presented by the Commis-
sion, except in areas within the EU that fall exclusively within 
Member States’ competence, in which case it shall be presented by 
the Presidency of the Council or by the Commission, Iceland and 
Norway as appropriate.”172 
Hence, in the multilateral sphere the Member States can con-
tinue to appear alongside the EU, and sometimes even instead of 
the EU, including in their treaty relations with the United States.  
In each instance, however, their nature as EU members should be 
taken into account, as should be the EU’s position as a non-state 
entity that does not fully replace its members. 
 
3.3.  The 28 Member States as “Strange Subjects” 
 
In international relations scholarship, the EU has been de-
scribed as a “strange animal,”173 given that it is “not quite a state 
but with more powers than many nation states in the international 
system.”174  This is due, politically, to its still considerable com-
bined capacities,175 and, legally, to its supranational features.  
However, as De Witte rightly pointed out, not only the EU, but al-
                                                                                                                   
on the one hand, and the Unites States of America, on the other hand, 2007 O.J. (L 
134) 1. 
170  Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-EU (Iceland, Norway), June 21, 2011, 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170897.pdf.  This agreement is 
not in force but provisionally applied.  
171  Ancillary Agreement, June 21, 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 283) 16. 
172 Id. at art. 3, ¶ 2.  
173  FRASER CAMERON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY 6 (2d 
ed., 2012). 
174  Id. 
175  Andrew Moravcsik, Europe Is Still a Superpower, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 13, 
2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/13/35uropa-is-still-a-superpower/ 
[https://perma.cc/DC4E-SA9K]. 
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so its Member States have become strange subjects of international 
law.176  This is due mainly to the tension between, on the one hand, 
having conferred extensive powers upon the EU to act internation-
ally, and, on the other, the desire to remain present themselves on 
the international scene.  In contrast to the constitutional framework 
of the U.S. with its “sole organ” 177 and “Commander in Chief”178 
running the nation’s foreign affairs, one could thus speak of a ra-
ther “open” version of “foreign affairs federalism” in the case of 
the EU.179  As the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy for Foreign and Securi-
ty Policy formulated it: “EU foreign policy is not a solo perfor-
mance: it is an orchestra which plays from the same score.”180 
To make sure that this “orchestra” plays in harmony, EU exter-
nal relations law has developed a number of principles, many of 
which have a constraining effect on the freedom of the Member 
States when acting internationally.  To mention the most important 
ones, there is, first, the duty to respect the Union’s “exclusive com-
petences.”  These are areas which have been explicitly designated 
as such in the EU Treaties,181 but also those where the Union has 
adopted “common rules” which may be affected by international 
actions of the Member States.182  This means that Member States 
can become pre-empted from acting as new EU rules are being 
adopted.183  In those areas “only the Union may legislate and adopt 
legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so them-
                                                   
176  Bruno De Witte, The Emergence of a European System of Public International 
Law: The EU and its Member States as Strange Subjects, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (Jan Wouters et. Al. eds., 2008). 
177  The term “sole organ” dates back to 1800, when Chief Justice Marshall 
used it in a speech to Congress: “The President is the sole organ of the nation in its 
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations,” as cited in 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); see also 
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 41–45 (2d ed., 1996). 
178  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
179  Schütze, supra note 112, at 65. 
180  SHARED VISION COMMON ACTION: A STRONGER EUROPE, supra note 55, at 46. 
181  TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 3, ¶ 1. 
182  The latter is also known as the “ERTA” effect after the seminal decision in 
Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263.  See Cremona, supra note 76 
(discussing the different kinds of EU external competence and the evolution of 
case law on this matter over time). 
183  Opinion 1/03, Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lu-
gano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters, 2006 E.C.R. I-01145, ¶ 126 (noting that it 
“is also necessary to take into account not only the current state of Community 
law in the area in question but also its future development, insofar as that is fore-
seeable at the time of that analysis …”); see also Cremona, supra note 76, at 249–50. 
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selves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementa-
tion of Union acts.”184  
Where there is no EU Treaty-based exclusive competence or 
common rules, Member States are still bound by what the Treaty 
on European Union calls the “principle of sincere cooperation.”185  
The principle operates in such a way to ensure that Member States 
do not negotiate international agreements in parallel to the EU,186 
or even set in motion procedures in international fora that disturb 
the “unity in the international representation of the Union and its 
Member States.”187  In other areas, the EU and Member States can 
continue to act in parallel.  These include development cooperation 
and humanitarian aid.188  Regarding the CFSP/CSDP in particular, 
cooperation is framed as “political solidarity”189 rather than as a 
rigid legally enforceable obligation.190  While sincere cooperation in 
all these instances applies as a legal duty, its effects and degrees of 
justiciability change.191  In the area of security and defense in par-
ticular, the Member States retain a large degree of flexibility and 
freedom to act internationally.  
Thus, the Member States of the EU, while being the sovereign 
equals of other states from the point of view of international law, 
are legally constrained in their foreign relations in significant ways.  
This is the defining feature of ‘transatlantic trigonometry’:  Even 
                                                   
184  TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 2, ¶ 1. 
185  TEU, supra note 28, at art. 4, ¶ 3. 
186  See Case C-433/03, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2005 
E.C.R. I-06985 (holding that Germany had violated EU regulations by forming bi-
lateral agreements with Romania, Poland, and Ukraine).  
187  See Case C-246/07, Commission v. Kingdom of Sweden, 2010 E.C.R. I-
03317, ¶ 104 (stating that Sweden, by unilaterally adding to a list of pollutants, 
would likely compromise the “principle of unity in the international representa-
tion of the Union and its Member States”); see also Andrés Delgado Casteleiro & 
Joris Larik, The Duty to Remain Silent: Limitless Loyalty in EU External Relations?, 36 
EUR. L. REV. 522, 533 (2011) (discussing that the duty is in principle reciprocal, but 
in practice has been applied predominantly to restrain Member State actions). 
188  TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 4, ¶ 4. 
189  TEU, supra note 28, at art. 24, ¶ 3, subpara. 2.  
190  Id. at art. 24, ¶ 1, subpara. 2 (excluding largely the jurisdiction of the CJEU 
from this area and noting that the “adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded,” 
which could produce a preemptive effect). 
191  See Joris Larik, Pars Pro Toto: The Member States’ Obligations of Sincere Co-
operation, Solidarity and Unity, in STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES IN EU EXTERNAL 
RELATIONS LAW 175, 183–84 (Marise Cremona ed., 2018) (“… [Q]uestions remain, 
first, to what extent these legal duties incumbent on the Member States fall under 
the jurisdiction of the CJEU, and if so, to what extent they are justiciable and with 
what consequences.”).  
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when international legal relations between Washington and an EU 
Member State are at stake, Brussels is always the third point to 
keep in mind.  At times, this is as obvious as being a treaty partner 
alongside the Member States, while at other times it is in more sub-
tle and implicit ways, where the EU itself does not feature as a trea-
ty party of the U.S.  This applies to both bilateral and multilateral 
settings.   
 
3.3.1.  Bilateral 
 
The U.S. maintains bilateral treaty relations with all EU Mem-
ber States, amounting to many hundreds of treaties currently in 
force between them.  Among those are 160 treaties in force with the 
UK.192  Rather than attempting to cover them all, which would be a 
highly repetitive exercise, a number of general patterns can be 
highlighted with particular regard to the relationship with the EU 
in the background.   
First, the treaties in force between the U.S. and EU Member 
States, which are not mixed in that they do not include the EU as a 
party, reflect the policy areas in which Member States retain com-
petences of their own.  Otherwise put, this concerns powers which 
have not been conferred upon the EU in such a way that the Mem-
ber States would be preempted from acting.  This includes, for in-
stance, treaties in the military domain.193  At the same time, as was 
seen above, this does not preclude the EU from concluding bilat-
eral treaties with the U.S. on military matters under its Common 
Security and Defence Policy without the Member States as parties 
(supra 3.2.1).  In other cases, treaties regulate territorial matters or 
issues relating to the settlement of historical disputes,194 which are 
issues that fall outside the scope of EU law or where Member State 
powers are clearly retained.195 
                                                   
192  U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 485–95, and not counting any of the 
treaties the UK has with the U.S. on behalf of various overseas territories. 
193  See, e.g., Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United 
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Denmark Con-
cerning Ballistic Missile Defense Technology, U.S.-Den., Oct. 25, 2005 (extending 
United States Ballistic Missile Defense System protection to Denmark). 
194  See, e.g., Treaty on the delimitation in the Caribbean of a maritime bound-
ary relating to the U.S. Virgin Islands and Anguilla, Anguilla-U.S., Nov. 5, 1993, 
1913 U.N.T.S. 5. 
195  See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 4, ¶ 2 (stating that the EU “shall respect [the 
Member States’] essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integ-
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Second, at the other end of the spectrum of the impact of EU 
membership obligations, are those areas where the EU has exclu-
sive competences.  There, Member States are preempted from act-
ing and hence are barred from negotiating treaties with the U.S.  
This explains the absence of trade and trade-related agreements be-
tween the U.S. and individual Member States.  This issue came 
clearly to the fore in a phone conversation between the U.S. Presi-
dent and German Chancellor Merkel in 2017.  According to media 
reports, the President asked repeatedly about bilateral trade nego-
tiations with Germany and “[e]very time the Chancellor replied: 
‘You can’t do a trade deal with Germany, only the EU.’”196 
In between these two extremes, there is a grey area of evolving 
legislation and policy.197  This fluidity does not make the collective 
of the Union and Member States an easy partner on the interna-
tional stage, as could be seen already from the American concerns 
about liability in the GPS/Galileo Agreement (supra 3.2.1).  Other 
examples of relevance in transatlantic relations include air 
transport services and bilateral investment treaties.  For example, a 
number of Member States, but not the UK, have concluded bilat-
eral investment treaties (BITs) with the U.S., mostly from before 
they became EU members.198  Subsequently, the EU has acquired 
exclusive powers in matters relating to foreign direct investment 
and started developing its own investment policy.199  It has not, 
                                                                                                                   
rity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.”). 
196  Lucy Pasha-Robinson, Angela Merkel “had to Explain Fundamentals of EU 
Trade to Donald Trump 11 Times”, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 24, 2017), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/39uropa3939/us-politics/angela-
merkel-donald-trump-explain-eu-trade-11-times-germany-chancellor-us-
president-a7699591.html [https://perma.cc/J8RY-EHJV]. 
197  See Friedrick Erlbacher, Recent Case Law on the  External Competences of the 
European Union: How Member States can Embrace their own Treaty (Ctr. For the Law 
of EU External Rel., Working Paper No. 43, 2017) 
http://www.asser.nl/media/3485/cleer17-2_web.pdf, [https://perma.cc/7XSW-
KGKB] (arguing, among other things, that situations where Member State action 
becomes pre-empted by the EU’s international agreements is rare  and that reduc-
ing mixity will not lead to the disappearance of the Member States from the inter-
national stage). 
198  See e.g., Treaty between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Republic of Latvia Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, with Annex and Protocol, U.S.-Lat., Jan. 
13, 1995, T.I.A.S. 96-1226. 
199  See Angelos Dimopoulos, Creating an EU Foreign Investment Policy: Chal-
lenges for the Future, in EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-
LISBON ERA 401 (Paul James Cardwell ed., 2011) (discussing challenges related to 
the development of EU foreign investment policy). 
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however, acquired powers over non-direct (portfolio) invest-
ments,200 while the legality of BITs concluded by EU Member 
States remains in limbo.201  
In the area of air transport, several Member States had bilateral 
treaties as well, including with the U.S.202  Due to the provisional 
application of the U.S.-EU “Open Skies” Agreement mentioned 
above (supra 3.2.2), 23 such agreements are suspended “for the du-
ration of provisional application” of the U.S.-EU Air Transport 
Agreement.203  This is also the case for the UK, whose agreement 
on “North Atlantic air fares” with the U.S. entered into force in 
1978.204  
Hence, if the U.S. were to engage an EU Member State in treaty 
negotiations, it may receive starkly different reactions depending 
on the subject matter and legislative state of play.  It may either 
proceed when a Member State is confident that the issues to be ad-
dressed continue to fall within its own powers, though remaining 
weary not to violate any other EU law obligations—present and fu-
ture—while doing so.  Or it may reject American advances, as it 
would be recruited into breaching existing obligations under EU 
law or exercising powers it conferred on the Union.  In the latter 
scenario, the U.S. would try to bend what is arguably the most sol-
id side of the triangular relationship. 
 
                                                   
200  See Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union 
and the Republic of Singapore, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, 2017, ¶ 238, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A62015CV0002%2801%29 
[https://perma.cc/V6A4-KS99]. 
201  See Case C-284/16, Slowakische Republik v. Achmea BV, judgement of 
Mar. 6, 2018 (not yet reported) (holding that the arbitration clauses contained in 
BITs between EU Member States are incompatible with EU law).  For BITs be-
tween Member States and third countries, a regime of authorization by the Euro-
pean Commission is in place.  See also Regulation (EU) 1219/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 40 (establishing transitional ar-
rangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third 
countries). 
202  See, e.g., Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America 
and the Federal Republic of Germany, U.S.-Ger., July 7, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 527, T.I.A.S. 
3536 (establishing mutual rights for aircraft of either party and specifying how 
flights between the two countries can operate). 
203  See, U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 22, 35, 55, 114, 121, 153, 162, 177, 
205, 226, 238, 239, 289, 301, 338, 390, 393, 398, 425, 439, 450, and 495.  
204  Agreement on Air Transport Services, U.K.-U.S., Mar. 17, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 
2676, T.I.A.S. 8964. 
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3.3.2.  Multilateral 
 
In the multilateral sphere, a distinction needs to be made again 
between “mixed” and “non-mixed” settings, i.e., whether the EU is 
a party alongside the Member States.  From a Member State’s point 
of view, this includes scenarios where it would face the U.S. among 
other third parties, sometimes with also the EU being present as a 
party, as an (enhanced) observer, or not at all.  In the latter case, 
however, the presence of the EU may still be felt where Member 
States are compelled to act in the EU’s interest. 
An example where all are present is the WTO (see supra 3.2.2).  
The Member States’ presence there was justified given that the 
WTO Agreements covered more than the scope of the Common 
Commercial Policy (“CCP”) at the time of its founding, for in-
stance, with regard to intellectual property rights.205  Today, given 
the expanded scope of the CCP, it is more questionable that the 
Member States are still legally required in Geneva, though even 
with very limited shared powers, a case for “mixity” can still be 
made.206  In practice, the European Commission represents the EU 
and the Member States at the WTO.  This includes dispute settle-
ment and cases that have been launched against individual Mem-
ber States.207  The Member States’ very limited role in the WTO is 
justified in EU external relations law.  Given the expanse of exclu-
sive competence in this area, complemented by the duty of sincere 
cooperation, Member States must tread very carefully lest they vio-
late their obligations under EU law. 
Moreover, the principles of exclusivity and sincere cooperation 
apply in international settings where the Member States are repre-
sented, but the EU cannot be despite having been conferred pow-
ers in the area at hand.  Such situations arise because certain multi-
lateral organizations do not allow for non-state entities to become 
                                                   
205  See Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to Conclude Interna-
tional Agreements Concerning Services and the Protection of Intellectual Proper-
ty, 1994 E.C.R. I-05267, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61994CV0001 [https://perma.cc/6GDZ-
N7UZ]. 
206  See Joris Larik, Sincere Cooperation in the Common Commercial Policy: Lisbon, 
a “Joined-Up” Union, and “Brexit”, 8 EUR. YBK. INT’L ECON. L. 83, 105-06 (2017).  
207  See Andrés Delgado Casteleiro & Joris Larik, The “Odd Couple”: Responsi-
bility of the EU at the WTO, in THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 233, 239–40 (Malcolm Evans 
& Panos Koutrakos eds., 2013) (summarizing the practice of the EU stepping in to 
defend its Member States in WTO disputes). 
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members (see supra 3.2.2).  But even here, though the EU is not rep-
resented by its own institutions, other countries, including the U.S., 
have to remember the “triangular” relationship nonetheless.  This 
includes forums such as the ILO and IMO, where EU Member 
States are bound to act under EU law in the Union’s interest to the 
extent that they are—vicariously—exercising EU competences.208 
In the domains where EU membership obligations are less 
stringent, the EU-Member State side of the triangle is less rigid.  
For instance, at the United Nations, all Member States are repre-
sented, but the EU cannot be a member.  When measures fall in the 
area of security and defense policy, the Member States are freer to 
act.  In principle, they remain bound by the duty of sincere cooper-
ation, but the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice is excluded 
from this area.209  Moreover, the Member States added declarations 
to the EU Treaties affirming their independent role, especially as 
permanent members of the UN Security Council.210  Hence, when 
U.S. representatives face their French counterparts, they can as-
sume that they will act and vote on behalf of their country, largely 
unconstrained by EU membership.  Nonetheless, as the Kadi saga 
on the constitutionality of targeted UN sanctions under EU law il-
lustrates, the EU Member States may in principle be compelled to 
refuse implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions, even if 
they helped adopt them in the first place.211 
Another example from the security domain and pillar of the 
transatlantic relationship is NATO, of which the EU itself cannot 
become a member either.212  By contrast, 22 EU Member States are 
members of NATO.  The non-NATO members in the EU are: Aus-
tria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden, which maintain 
security policies of neutrality or non-alignment.213  A loose cooper-
                                                   
208  See Case C-45/07, Comm’n v. Hellenic Republic, 2009 E.C.R. 81, ¶ 31 (“the 
fact that the Community is not a member of an international 42uropa424242ion 
does not prevent its external competence from being in fact exercised, in particu-
lar through the Member States acting jointly in the Community’s interest.”). 
209  TEU, supra note 28, at art. 24, ¶ 3, subpara. 2. 
210  See Declarations Annexed to the Final act of the Intergovernmental Con-
ference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 O.J. 
(C326) 345 (concerning the common foreign and security policy, stressing that the 
provisions on the CFSP “will not affect the … powers of each Member State in re-
lation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, … and participation in 
international organisations, including a Member State’s membership of the Securi-
ty Council of the United Nations”). 
211  See Kadi v. Council, supra note 77, at ¶ 285. 
212  See supra note 151. 
213  See JORIS LARIK, FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2
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ative arrangement, “Berlin Plus”, exists between the EU and 
NATO since 2002, but has been used only twice, in 2003 and 
2004.214  Whereas the TEU explicitly notes that the EU has its own 
security and defense policy, it also states that the EU “shall respect 
the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common 
defence realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO).”215  Hence, when the U.S. deals with EU Member States in 
the North Atlantic Council, the EU-Member State side of the trian-
gle is relatively weak. 
Given the dichotomy of modes of operation of the EU in its ex-
ternal relations, as well as the diversity of international treaty set-
tings, which cover different policy areas, mixed/non-mixed 
agreements, and bilateral treaties with the Member States, the deci-
sion of a Member State to leave the EU will affect its respective 
transatlantic triangle in various ways and to varying degrees.  
 
4.  ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND THEIR TRANSATLANTIC DIMENSION 
 
As long as the UK is a member of the EU, its relationship with 
the U.S. is of the same triangular nature as that of the other 27 
Member States.  Most importantly, the UK’s relations with the U.S. 
require it to respect its obligations under EU law, particularly in-
ternal EU legislation, the EU’s external competences, and the duty 
of sincere cooperation.  This situation is fundamentally different 
for non-EU Member States, whose relations with both the U.S. and 
the EU and its Member States are governed by public international 
law.  Nonetheless, the closer the association of a third country with 
the EU, the more that relationship acquires a triangular character.  
The main difference is that these are a priori legally equal relation-
ships within the framework of international law, instead of one be-
ing governed by international law and the other by EU law, which 
enjoys primacy over domestic law of the Member States, including 
their respective international legal commitments.216 
                                                                                                                   
LAW 192–94 (2016) (summarizing the security policies of the non-NATO EU 
Member States). 
214  See Steven Blockmans, The Influence of NATO on the Development of the 
EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, in BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCE: 
THE EU LEGAL ORDER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 243, 
259 (Ramses A. Wessel & Steven Blockmans eds., 2013).  
215  See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 42, ¶ 2, subpara 2. 
216  See supra note 77. 
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In this section, four main models of treaty relations for third 
countries with the EU are outlined, ranging from a closer associa-
tion with the EU to looser arrangements.  A fifth option would be 
one without a particular bilateral treaty framework, governed only 
by multilateral treaty frameworks and customary international 
law.  The UK’s Prime Minister appears strongly opposed to the 
first three models (Norway, Switzerland and Turkey) in her Lan-
caster House Speech of January 2017 and subsequent key policy 
statements.217  However, this may not be the last word and even af-
ter Brexit, the relationship between the UK and EU is not necessari-
ly set in stone.  A “hard” Brexit can be “softened” over time, and 
vice versa.  In any event, it remains useful to explore the available 
options and what they entail in terms of the UK’s freedom of action 
for interacting with the U.S.218 
As the following models show, the difference—and difficulty—
lies in the economic sphere rather than that of security and defense.  
The more sensitive the EU is to the sovereignty concerns of its own 
Member States in the area of security and defense, the more unen-
cumbered third countries closely associated with it are.  By con-
trast, in the trade and regulatory sphere, the legal constraints on 
the external maneuvering space of third countries are wide-
ranging.  For the U.S., this matters in terms of what to expect in its 
interaction with a post-Brexit UK.  
 
                                                   
217  See Prime Minister Theresa May, Prime Minister’s Office, The govern-
ment’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech 8–9 (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-
objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech [https://perma.cc/6S2L-VT9X] (“So we 
do not seek membership of the single market. . . . I do not want Britain to be part 
of the Common Commercial Policy and I do not want us to be bound by the 
Common External Tariff.  These are the elements of the Customs Union that pre-
vent us from striking our own comprehensive trade agreements with other coun-
tries.”).  See also HM GOVERNMENT, THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2018, Cm. 9593, at 6 (UK) (in the foreword to 
this White Paper, which followed the British cabinet talks at Chequers (the 
“Chequers Plan”), the Prime Minister reiterated that the UK will be “leaving the 
Single Market and the Customs Union, ending free movement and the jurisdiction 
of the European Court of Justice in this country”). 
218  See Mitchel van der Wel & Ramses A. Wessel, The Brexit Roadmap: Map-
ping the Choices and Consequences during the EU/UK withdrawal and Future Relation-
ship Negotiations 73–75 (Ctr. For the Law of EU External Rel., Working Paper No. 
5,  2017), http://www.asser.nl/media/4140/cleer17-5_web.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/28J7-84XT] (noting the “Ukraine model” of an association 
agreement as another variation on these main models that does not include EEA 
membership or a customs union).  
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4.1.  Norway 
 
The closest model of association with the EU is joining the Eu-
ropean Economic Area (“EEA”).  The EEA, set up in 1994,219 con-
sists of the EU and European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries 
minus Switzerland (see infra 4.2.).  This model is often referred to 
as the “Norway model” in public discourse.220  Iceland and Liech-
tenstein are in a similar position regarding trade, but given that 
Norway is also a NATO member with an army, it makes sense to 
focus on it as a possibility for the United Kingdom.  
As a member of the EEA, non-EU countries accept parts of the 
acquis communautaire, i.e., EU laws and regulations, without having 
a vote in their adoption.  This arrangement is unique in that the 
“EEA Agreement is the only EU external agreement to employ so-
called homogeneity as a means of ensuring the actual adaptation of 
the dynamic post-signature acquis communautaire into the legal or-
ders of the EFTA member states.”221  This means EEA countries re-
tain access to the EU’s internal market while the EU rests assured 
that they comply with relevant EU rules as they continue to evolve. 
EEA membership covers free movement of goods, services, 
capital, and persons, as well as competition policy, but excludes 
“the common agricultural, fisheries and transport policies, [direct 
EU] budget contributions and regional policy, taxation, as well as 
economic and monetary policy.”222  Norway hence has to respect 
                                                   
219  See Agreement on the European Economic Area, Mar. 17, 1993, 1994 O.J. 
(L 1) 3, https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/09/9-
01/eea_agreement.xml [https://perma.cc/4YG6-RQAN] [hereinafter EEA 
Agreement] (founding the EEA, which brings together the EU Member States and 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). See also Sven Norberg & Martin Johansson, 
The History of the EEA Agreement and the First Twenty Years of Its Existence, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF EEA LAW 3, 15–32 (Carl Baudenbacher ed., 2016) (discussing the 
origins and negotiating history of the EEA Agreement).  
220  See Charlie Cooper, Macron to May: ‘Be my Guest’ to Norway-model Brexit, 
POLITICO (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/45uropa4545-macron-
theresa-may-france-uk-be-my-guest-to-norway-model-brexit/ 
[https://perma.cc/DXZ8-VZDX] (arguing that maintaining Britain’s financial 
services industry’s access to the EU single market will require the UK to adopt the 
Norway model). 
221  Roman Petrov, Exporting the Acquis Communautaire into the Legal Systems of 
Third Countries, 13 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 33, 37 (2008). 
222  Sieglinde Gstöhl, Models of External Differentiation in the EU’s Neighbour-
hood: An Expanding Economic Community?, 22 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 854, 858 (2015).  See 
also Hannes Hofmeister, Splendid Isolation or Continued Cooperation? Options for a 
State After Withdrawal from the EU, 21 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 256 (2015) (discussing 
the scope and content of EEA membership). 
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the EU’s four freedoms, including free movement of persons,223 
and in addition takes part in the passport-free “Schengen area.”224  
Though EEA countries are consulted, they do not get to vote 
within the EU’s legislative processes.  Hence, under a Norway-
model the UK “would be bound by many of the EU’s rules, but no 
longer have a vote or veto on the creation of those rules.”225  Insti-
tutionally, the “main discussions take place within the EEA Joint 
Committee in the so-called ‘decision-shaping phase’ after the [Eu-
ropean] Commission transmits its proposals to the EU Council and 
the European Parliament, as well as to the EEA EFTA states.”226  
Subsequently, the EEA Joint Committee decides by consensus “as 
closely as possible in time to the adoption of the rules in the EU in-
stitutions in order to allow for a more or less simultaneous applica-
tion of the acquis”.227  Moreover, to make sure EEA countries com-
ply, a special EFTA Surveillance Authority was created, which can 
take EEA countries to an EFTA Court.228  This court, in turn, aligns 
itself largely with the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU.229  
                                                   
223  See Kjartan Bjarni Björgvinsson, Free Movement of Persons, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF EEA LAW 473 (Carl Baudenbacher ed., 2016) (stating that the EU’s 
four freedoms are binding on non-EU countries that are members of the EEA).   
224  Norway and Iceland assume these obligations by entering special agree-
ments.  See e.g., Agreement Concluded by the Council of the European Union, the 
Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway Concerning the Latters’ Associa-
tion with the Implementation, Application, and Development of the Schengen 
Acquis, May 18, 1999, 1999 O.J. (L 176) 36, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A21999A0710%2802%29 
[https://perma.cc/FTB7-AGRY] (exemplifying a special agreement whereby 
Norway and Iceland consent to adopt the Schengen protocols).  
225  HM GOVERNMENT, ALTERNATIVES TO MEMBERSHIP: POSSIBLE MODELS FOR THE 
UNITED KINGDOM OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION 16 (Mar. 2016), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/504604/Alternatives_to_membership_-
_possible_models_for_the_UK_outside_the_EU.pdf [https://perma.cc/5D9N-
EVUJ] (acknowledging the UK’s loss of voting rights three months before the 
Brexit referendum). 
226  Gstöhl, supra note 222, at 858. 
227  Id. 
228  See id. (explaining EFTA’s enforcement power). 
229  See EEA Agreement, supra note 219, at art. 6 (requiring homogeneous in-
terpretation with CJEU case law only dating until the signature of the EEA 
Agreements).  But see, Joined Cases E-9/07 and E-10/07, L’Oréal Norge AS v. Aar-
skog Per AS & Others & Smart Club Norge, 2008 EFTA Ct. Rep. 258, ¶ 28 (“In its 
interpretation of EEA rules, the Court has consistently taken into account the rele-
vant rulings of the [CJEU] after the said date.”).  See generally H.H. Fredriksen, 
Bridging the Widening Gap between the EU Treaties and the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area, 18 EUR. L. J. 868, 869–70 (2012) (discussing how the legislative ho-
mogeneity between EU and EEA law is complemented by the homogenous inter-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2
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However, all this does not make the EEA a borderless region.  
For instance, customs and rules of origins checks at the Norway-
EU border continue to apply.230  Nonetheless, it provides a largely 
homogenous regulatory space and thus wide-ranging access to the 
EU’s internal market. 
In their external relations EEA countries are relatively unen-
cumbered by the EU.  They do not have to go along with the EU’s 
Common Commercial Policy, the CFSP/CSDP, or other external 
policies.  EEA countries hence can negotiate free trade agreements 
(“FTAs”) with other countries, which they do as a bloc of EFTA 
countries.231  However, the EEA countries are limited in their scope 
of maneuver in regulatory matters when negotiating trade agree-
ments with other countries, as they need to maintain compliance 
with the relevant EU rules in order to retain access to the internal 
market.  Neither Norway nor EFTA have a modern trade agree-
ment with the U.S.,232 though FTAs are in force between EFTA and, 
among others, Canada and South Korea. 
In the area of security and defense policy, EEA countries are 
completely free to go their own way.  Norway and Iceland are 
members of NATO, while Liechtenstein is not.  Moreover, Norway 
has numerous bilateral agreements with the U.S. in the defense 
field.233  However, this freedom does not imply hostility towards 
the EU’s CFSP/CSDP.  To the contrary, Norway has contributed to 
several EU military and civilian operations under a third-country 
arrangement.234  Moreover, Norway officially aligns itself at times 
with EU positions at the United Nations.235  
                                                                                                                   
pretations of the EFTA Court and CJEU). 
230  HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 225, at 17. 
231  See EFTA, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND TRADE RELATIONS BY COUNTRY, 
http://www.efta.int/free-trade/free-trade-agreements [https://perma.cc/KP7Z-
F3DK] (last visited Jan. 22, 2017) (overviewing how EEA countries negotiate free 
trade agreements). 
232  See U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 334. 
233  Id. at 330–31. 
234  See Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Nor-
way Establishing a Framework for the Participation of the Kingdom of Norway to 
the Crisis Management Operations Led by the European Union, Dec. 3, 2004, 2005 
O.J. (L 67) 8, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreaties 
Workspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=55 
[https://perma.cc/FTB7-AGRY] (defining Norway’s right to contribute armed 
forces to assist the EU in crisis management operations). 
235  See, e.g., Anne Kemppainen, Minister Counsellor, Eur. Union, EU General 
Statement delivered at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
1st Committee: Vote on Cluster VII (Regional disarmament and security) concern-
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Consequently, it would be more accurate to speak of two 
“Norway models.”  First, there is the traditionally known model 
for the economic and regulatory sphere, including free movement 
of persons, which is restrictive and limits Norway’s international 
action.  Here, the EU side of the triangle remains strong.  However, 
a different kind of Norway model exists for the wider foreign poli-
cy and security sphere, which is not restrictive but allows for close 
cooperation. 
 
4.2.  Switzerland 
 
Unlike Norway’s case of EEA membership, the Swiss model is 
constructed through a range of bilateral agreements.236  While 
Switzerland is a member of EFTA and took part in the negotiations 
for the EEA, it refused to join the latter in 1992 following a negative 
domestic referendum result.237  The principal starting point for the 
bilateral treaties was the 1972 FTA,238 which was followed by two 
sets of more specific bilateral treaties in 1999239 and 2004,240 respec-
tively.  Since 2004, additional agreements have been concluded, in-
cluding on cooperation with Europol, Eurojust, and the European 
Defence Agency (EDA), cooperation between competition authori-
                                                                                                                   
ing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Nov. 1, 2017) (transcript available 
at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/36634/eu-general-statement-–
-united-nations-1st-committee-vote-cluster-vi-comprehensive-nuclear-test_en) 
[https://perma.cc/96HE-DBPP] (“[t]he EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Nor-
way, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine . . .  align 
themselves with this statement.”).  
236  See SWISS CONFEDERATION, DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES EUROPEENNES, LISTE DES 
ACCORDS SUISSE–UNION EUROPEENNE EN VIGUEUR AU 1ER JANVIER 2017, 
https ://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/dea/fr/documents 
/publikationen_dea/accords-liste_fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7MN-89NU] (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2017) (compiling a complete list of bilateral agreements, including 
all additional protocols and amendments). 
237  Norberg & Johansson, supra note 219, at 31. 
238  Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss 
Confederation, July 22, 1972, 1972 O.J. (L 300) 189 (agreeing to promote the har-
monious development of economic relations through the expansion of reciprocal 
trade between the European Economic Community and Switzerland). 
239  These cover free movement of persons, technical barriers to trade, public 
procurement markets, agriculture, research, civil aviation, and overland transport. 
240  These cover, inter alia, the Schengen (passport-free travel) and Dublin 
Agreements (on asylum applications), taxation of savings, fight against fraud, 
processed agricultural products, the environment, pensions, education, vocational 
training, and youth. 
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ties, satellite navigation, and company taxation.241 
In the economic realm, Switzerland’s access to the EU’s internal 
market is limited.  For instance, it has “access to a significant de-
gree of the trade in goods but agriculture is not covered”.242  More-
over, access in trade in services is limited, while the financial sector 
is excluded.243  On the latter point, it is relevant to note that Swit-
zerland cannot avail itself of the EU’s “passporting system that 
minimises the regulatory, operational and legal barriers to the pro-
vision of financial services across the EU.”244  Instead, “Swiss banks 
need to establish a subsidiary in an EU/EEA country … in order to 
obtain financial services passporting rights.”245 
Institutionally, the Swiss model “lacks an overarching structure 
to deal with the around 20 main agreements, most of which are on 
a technical level run by a consensus-based Joint Committee.”246  
There is no equivalent to the above-mentioned EFTA Surveillance 
Authority and EFTA Court, which would also contribute to super-
vising the relationship with the EU in view of ongoing legislative 
and regulatory developments.  The EU has been pushing for an in-
stitutionalized relationship for years,247 but thus far to no avail.248  
Without institutionalization, enforcement is left entirely to the dip-
lomatic realm.  In particular, the agreement contains so-called 
                                                   
241  See SWISS CONFEDERATION, supra note 236 (listing the bilateral agreements 
the Swiss Confederation has entered into with the EU).  
242  Van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 218, at 69. 
243  See Id. (noting that without the necessary passporting rights for financial 
services, Swiss banks wanting to operate in EU countries are required to open a 
subsidiary in an EU or EEA country). 
244  HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 225, at 26. 
245  Id. 
246  Gstöhl, supra note 222, at 860. 
247  See, e.g., Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on EU Rela-
tions with EFTA Countries, 3060th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, Dec. 
14, 2010, ¶ 42, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/council_iceland.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W55X-34JV] (criticizing Switzerland’s approach for “a lack of 
efficient arrangements for the take-over of new EU acquis including [CJEU] case-
law, and for ensuring the supervision and enforcement of the existing agreements 
… [resulting] in legal uncertainty for authorities, operators and individual citi-
zens.”). 
248  See SABINE JENNI, SWITZERLAND’S DIFFERENTIATED EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: 
THE LAST GALLIC VILLAGE? 176 (2016) (observing that forming an institutional 
framework agreement between Switzerland and the EU is so controversial—with 
the latter requesting a common monitoring and enforcement structure as well as 
obliging Switzerland to adopt EU legislation—that the parties have not even 
managed to set the terms of negotiation since 2012). 
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“guillotine clauses”,249 which means that a whole set of agreements 
cease to apply in case one of them is terminated or not renewed,250 
which can result in Switzerland’s access to the EU’s internal mar-
ket being cut off. 
In this framework, Switzerland is free to conclude its own trade 
agreements,251 though it remains bound by its commitments under 
the bilateral agreements with the EU.  Like Norway, it usually con-
cludes trade agreements within the EFTA framework, though it 
concluded a bilateral agreement with China.252  Like Norway, fur-
thermore, it has no modern trade agreement with the U.S., either 
bilaterally or through EFTA.  
In the area of security and defense, similar to the Norway mod-
el, Switzerland remains unencumbered by its legal proximity to the 
EU.  Unlike Atlanticist Norway, it pursues traditionally a strategy 
of neutrality.253  Nonetheless, it too has contributed to several of 
the EU’s civil and military CSDP operations,254 though Switzerland 
has not concluded a framework agreement with the EU to that ef-
fect.  At the same time, it entertains a number of agreements in the 
                                                   
249  Stephan Breitenmoser, Sectoral Agreements between the EC and Switzerland: 
Contents and Context, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1137, 1160 (2003). 
250  See, e.g., Agreement between the European Community and its Member 
States, of the One Part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the Other, on the Free 
Movement of Persons art. 25 ¶ 4, June 21, 1999, 2002 O.J. (L 141) 6, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:29b7e319-1314-4fbd-b1df-c0c0be226 
feb.0004.02/DOC_1&format=PDF [https://perma.cc/52DT-TCX8] (“The seven 
Agreements referred to in paragraph 1 shall cease to apply six months after re-
ceipt of notification of non-renewal referred to in paragraph 2 or termination re-
ferred to in paragraph 3.”). 
251  See HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 225, at 27 ¶ 3.31 (noting that Switzerland 
has 29 of its own trade agreements covering 41 countries). 
252  See Freihandelsabkommen zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossen-
schaft und der Volksrepublik China [Free Trade Agreement between the People’s 
Republic of China and the Swiss Confederation], July 6, 2013 Switz.-China., 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2751 
[https://perma.cc/KUK2-3V5J] (entered into force in 2014, establishing a free 
trade area between China and Switzerland). 
253  See HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 225, at 27 (“In foreign policy, Switzer-
land has a tradition of neutrality.”). 
254  See, e.g., Participation Agreement between the European Union and the 
Swiss Confederation on the Participation of the Swiss Confederation in the Euro-
pean Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), Apr. 13, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 
105) 3, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22016A0421(01)&from=EN 
[https://perma.cc/AYZ7-VAJT] (agreeing to participate in the EU’s capacity 
building mission in Mali).  See also Tardy, supra note 140, at 3 (providing overview 
of third countries’ contributions to CSDP operations). 
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field of defense with the United States.255  Unlike Norway, other 
EEA and EU candidate countries, Switzerland has no track record 
of formally aligning itself with EU statements and positions.  In 
terms of trigonometry in treaty relations, the same flexibility can be 
seen in the security and defense field.  In the trade and regulatory 
domain, by contrast, the EU-Swiss relationship is a “static”256 mod-
el that is out of favor with the EU and hence may not see replica-
tion elsewhere.  
 
 4.3.  Turkey 
 
A third model for association with the EU is embodied in the 
EU-Turkey relationship.  Turkey is not a member of EFTA or the 
EEA, and it does not have a set of bilateral agreements providing 
access to the internal market as is the case with Switzerland.  In-
stead, the EU and Turkey concluded an association agreement in 
1963,257 which has included a partial customs union since 1995.258  
Turkey remains a candidate country to the EU, though its path to 
membership appears long and full of obstacles in the current polit-
ical climate.259 
It would be a misconception to think that there is a single, all-
encompassing customs union of which the UK could remain a 
                                                   
255  See, e.g., Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, Switz.-U.S., art. 3, ¶ 
2, Mar. 23–Dec. 6, 2001 (agreeing to provide “logistic support, supplies and ser-
vices to the military forces of one Party by the other in return for either cash pay-
ment or the reciprocal provision of support … to the military forces of the other 
Party.”).  See also U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 450–52 (listing bilateral treaties 
in force between the U.S. and Switzerland as of January 1, 2018). 
256  See HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 225, at 26 (maintaining that the EU’s 
agreements with Switzerland are static in nature because while it does not have 
Norway’s direct obligation to ensure its domestic law complies with certain EU 
rules, the EU can still block it from accessing parts of the market if it fails to im-
plement domestic legislation reflecting those rules).   
257  See Agreement Creating an Association between the European Economic 
Community and Turkey, Eur. Econ. Cmty.-Turk., Dec. 12, 1963, 96 U.N.T.S. 142. 
258  See Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 Decem-
ber 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union, Dec. 22, 1995, 
1996 O.J. (L 35) 1. 
259  See Ece Toksabay & Tulay Karadeniz, EU Parliament Calls for Turkey Acces-
sion Talks to be Suspended, REUTERS (July 6, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-eu-parliament/eu-parliament-calls-
for-turkey-accession-talks-to-be-suspended-idUSKBN19R194 
[https://perma.cc/79L2-2DHR] (discussing the tensions between the EU and 
Turkey in light of the current political climate in Turkey). 
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member even after it leaves the EU.  Turkey is not in the customs 
union that is the EU, but has a partial customs union with the EU, 
which includes “industrial goods and processed agricultural 
goods” but excludes “raw agricultural goods.”260 
Regarding its external trade policy, the legal consequence of be-
ing in a customs union with the EU is that Turkey is committed to 
aligning its tariff schedules with the EU’s common external tariff, 
as far as is covered by their customs union,261 and to mimicking EU 
trade agreements with third countries.262  The EU-Turkish customs 
union, now considered “outdated,”263 gives Turkey little freedom, 
as the country “has no involvement in decisions about the [EU’s] 
Common External Tariff or setting the direction of the Common 
Commercial Policy.”264  Moreover, it leaves Turkey disadvantaged, 
as alignment does not mean that it will automatically “secure addi-
tional market access via EU FTAs with third countries, but these 
third countries have access to Turkey’s market.”265  For instance, 
Turkey has endeavored—unsuccessfully—to take part in negotia-
tions between the EU and the U.S. over the TTIP.266 
A proposed variation on a partial customs union is the so-
called “Jersey model,” named after the British crown dependency 
which entertains such a special arrangement with the EU.  Under 
such a model, “the UK remains in a comprehensive customs union 
with the EU and the single market, but only for goods.” 267  On the 
one hand, such a model would avoid border checks and in doing 
so provide a solution for avoiding a hard border on the island of 
Ireland.  On the other hand, it would severely restrict the scope of 
maneuver of the UK’s post-Brexit trade policy, essentially limiting 
it to services-only trade agreements with third countries.   
                                                   
260  See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 218, at 71. 
261  See Decision No 1/95 96/142/EC of the EC-Turkey Association Council, 
supra note 258, at art. 13.  
262  Id. at art. 16, ¶ 1 (“… Turkey will take the necessary measures and negoti-
ate agreements on mutually advantageous basis with the countries concerned.”). 
263  See Van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 218, at 71. 
264  House of Lords, European Union Committee, Brexit: The Options for Trade, 
5th Report of Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72 (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/72/72.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3S2J-CE3M]. 
265  Id.  
266  See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 218, at 72. 
267  See John Springford & Sam Lowe, Holding out Hope for a Half-Way Brexit 
House, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM BULLETIN NO. 118, 2 (Feb./Mar. 2018), 
https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/bulletin_118_js-sl_article2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VT9D-ET34]. 
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In the area of security and defense, as with Norway and Swit-
zerland, Turkey remains free to conduct its own policy.  It is a 
NATO member, has contributed to CSDP operations, and has con-
cluded a framework agreement with the EU to that effect.268  Tur-
key has a range of treaties in the defense field with the U.S. as 
well,269 but no comprehensive, modern trade agreement.270  As an 
EU candidate country, Turkey occasionally aligns itself with the 
EU in international fora.271 
In sum, in the areas of security and defense, also in the case of 
Turkey, the transatlantic triangle is very flexible and has allowed 
the country to cooperate closely both with the U.S. and the EU.  In 
the trade and regulatory field, the constraints imposed by Turkey’s 
association with the EU only cover certain sectors.  However, they 
weigh heavily due to the obligation of alignment without voting 
rights and without automatic economic benefits in return. 
 
4.4.  Canada 
 
Deep and comprehensive trade agreements represent a more 
hands-off approach to association with the EU than the models 
outlined above.  Nonetheless, they aim to provide “increased mar-
ket access and regulatory convergence.”272  The current “gold 
standard,” in the EU’s eyes,273 is embodied in the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada 
                                                   
268  See Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey 
Establishing a Framework for the Participation of the Republic of Turkey in the 
European Union Crisis Management Operations, June 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 189) 
17 (setting forth the conditions under which Turkey would be invited to contrib-
ute to EU crisis management).  See also Tardy, supra note 140, at 3 (listing seven 
CSDP missions to which Turkey contributed).  
269  See U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 467–68 (listing twenty-three defense 
treaties in force between the United States and Turkey).  
270  See Id. at 471 (noting the existence of an investment protection agreement 
signed in Washington, Dec. 3, 1985).  
271  See Kemppainen, supra note 235 (stating Turkey’s alignment with the Eu-
ropean Union’s General Statement concerning the Comprehensive Test Ban Trea-
ty).  
272  See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 218, at 72. 
273  See European Commission Statement 16/446, Joint statement: Canada-EU 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Feb. 29, 2016, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-446_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6BE2-9M6H] (announcing the completion of the legal review 
of the CETA).  
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(CETA), which was signed on October 30, 2016.  It is not yet in 
force, since as a mixed agreement it requires ratification by Cana-
da, the EU, and all of its Member States,274 which highlights the 
continued importance of the latter in this particular transatlantic 
triangle.  CETA has been provisionally applied since September 
2017.275  Moreover, an opinion has been requested from the CJEU 
to determine whether CETA, in particular its chapter on institu-
tionalized investment protection, is compatible with the EU Trea-
ties.276  Hence, ratification of such an advanced FTA is drawn out 
while legal uncertainty persists. 
CETA “phases out the tariffs on 98% of all goods and addresses 
several other discriminatory measures such as subsidies and quo-
tas,”277 but still maintains tariffs in some limited cases such as with 
fishery and agricultural products.278  Moreover, CETA guarantees 
geographical indications and opens public procurement markets.279  
Furthermore, it establishes a sophisticated institutional setup, in-
cluding a Joint Committee, inter-party arbitration, an Investment 
Court System (ICS), and a Regulatory Cooperation Forum.280  
While it is innovative in that it maintains a “negative list” ap-
proach to services, this still means that some sectors remain ex-
cluded, such as audio-visual services and public services in the ar-
                                                   
274  See CETA, supra note 108, at art. 30.7, ¶ 2. 
275  See Council Decision (EU) 2017/38 of 28 October 2016 on the Provisional 
Application of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Be-
tween Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union and its Member States, of 
the Other Part, 2017, O.J. (L 11) 1080, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D0038&from=EN 
[https://perma.cc/Z258-ZXDB] (including the exact date which was jointly an-
nounced).  See also European Commission Statement 17/1959, EU and Canada 
agree to set a date for the provisional application of the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement, July 8, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_STATEMENT-17-1959_en.htm [https://perma.cc/FHH5-FE8Q] (an-
nouncing the date of provisional application as September 21, 2017).  
276  See Opinion 1/17, Request for an opinion submitted by the Kingdom of 
Belgium pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, 2017 O.J. (C 369) 2.  
277  See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 218, at 72. 
278  Id. 
279  See CETA, supra note 108, at ch. 19 (on government procurement) and ch. 
20, section B, sub-section C (on geographical indications).  
280 Id. at art. 26.1 (on the Joint Committee), ch. 29 (on inter-party disputes), ch. 
8, section F (on investment disputes), and art. 21.6 (on the Regulatory Coopera-
tion Forum).  The new investment court system is not covered by provisional ap-
plication, see Council Decision (EU) 2017/38, supra note 275, at art. 1(a) (noting it 
does not include the CETA provisions which make up section F on the “Resolu-
tion of investment disputes between investors and states.”).  
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eas of health, education, and social protection.281  In terms of 
providing market access for financial services, it is a far cry from 
passporting rights that EU members enjoy.  In this domain, CETA 
offers not much more than what exists under the terms of the mul-
tilateral General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) already.  
This means “Canadian companies have to establish a subsidiary in 
the EU in order to be able to sell their financial services.”282 
Being an FTA with no customs union, Canada remains free to 
adjust its tariff schedules (as far as its WTO schedules allow) with 
the non-EU world.  Moreover, it can conclude trade agreements 
with third countries.  CETA and the additional Joint Interpretative 
Statement repeatedly stress the “right to regulate.”283  This implies 
regulatory freedom rather than restraint in Canada’s external trade 
policy.  However, while regulatory compliance with EU standards 
is not a legal requirement, it remains an economic necessity if Can-
ada wants to be able to export its goods and services to the EU.284  
Unlike Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey, Canada has a free trade 
agreement with the U.S. in the form of NAFTA (currently in the 
process of being revamped as  the USMCA), of which Mexico is al-
so a party.285  Thanks to CETA and NAFTA, Canada is an example 
of a country with wide-ranging market access covered by FTAs 
with both the EU and the U.S.  However, important limits apply to 
such access, while NAFTA is currently being renegotiated at the 
request of the Trump Administration.286 
                                                   
281  See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 217, at 72 (listing a few major ser-
vice sectors which are not included); see also Dominic Webb, CETA: The EU-Canada 
Free Trade Agreement, UK House of Commons Library Briefing Paper No. 7492 
(Sept. 12, 2017), at 11, 
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-
7492#fullreport [https://perma.cc/3NG2-J57T] (listing the public services which 
were excluded from CETA).  
282  See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 217, at 73. 
283  See CETA, supra note 108, at art. 8.9, ¶ 1, art. 23.2, art. 23.4.  See also Joint 
Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, Can.-
EU, Oct. 27, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 11) 3, pts. 1(e), 3, 6(a). 
284  See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 217, at 73 (“Besides compliance with 
EU rules and standards when exporting goods to the EU, Canada does not have to 
incorporate any EU legislation within its domestic legislation.”).  
285  See U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 64–78 (overviewing the bilateral 
agreements between Canada and the U.S.). 
286  See, U.S. Office of the Trade Representative, Summary of Objectives for 
the NAFTA Renegotiation (July 17, 2017), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V8KF-TXEM] (announcing the renegotiation of NAFTA at the 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
 
56 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 40:1 
In the area of security and defense, it is noteworthy that CETA 
is accompanied by a Strategic Partnership Agreement between 
Canada and the EU.287  The language of the latter is rather hortato-
ry, and leaves Canada as free as the countries in the examples 
above.  For instance, the agreement stresses common international 
commitments, ranging from human rights288 to the International 
Criminal Court,289 and establishes a political dialogue and consul-
tative mechanism.290  In addition and prior to the 2016 Strategic 
Partnership Agreement, Canada concluded a framework agree-
ment with the EU on taking part in CSDP operations,291 and con-
tributed to several of these operations over the years.292  Like Nor-
way, Canada is a NATO member and also has numerous bilateral 
treaties with the U.S. in the field of defense.293  Hence, in the securi-
ty and defense field, Canada is able to entertain simultaneous co-
operation arrangements with both the EU and the U.S.  
Canada’s example shows legal commitments with a large de-
gree of flexibility in both the trade and security dimensions of its 
relationship with both the EU and U.S.  Nevertheless, in order to 
benefit from the significant but nonetheless limited market access 
granted by CETA, Canada needs to comply with relevant EU legis-
lation and regulation. 
 
                                                                                                                   
behest of President Trump).  
287  See Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its 
Member States, of the One Part, and Canada, of the Other Part, EU-Can., Oct. 30, 
2016, 2016 O.J. (L 329) 45, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22016A1203(03)&qid=1536962793825&from=E
N [https://perma.cc/DM9N-96MY]. 
288  Id. at art. 2. 
289  Id. at art. 5. 
290  Id. at arts. 26 and 27. 
291  See Agreement between the European Union and Canada Establishing a 
Framework for the Participation of Canada in the European Union Crisis Man-
agement Operations, EU-Can., Nov. 24, 2005, 2005 O.J. (L 315) 21, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22005A1201(01)&qid=1536962972715&from=E
N [https://perma.cc/M928-JV2B] (enumerating the conditions under which the 
EU may invite Canada into its crisis management operations).  
292  See Tardy, supra note 140, at 3 (listing Canadian contributions to CSDP 
operations). 
293  See U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 64–78 (listing bilateral treaties be-
tween Canada and the United States). 
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4.5.  “No Deal” 
 
Another option, though not really a “model,” is that the EU 
and UK will fail to agree on a future agreement which would close-
ly associate them with each other.  In the trade realm, such a “no 
deal” scenario would lead to their trade relationship falling back 
onto WTO rules, including the application of tariffs in certain areas 
and limits in terms of access to the EU internal market, especially 
in the area of services.294  According to economic modelling by 
RAND Europe in 2017, such a scenario would result in reducing 
the UK’s “future GDP (compared to full EU membership) by about 
4.9 per cent, or $140bn, over 10 years.”295  For the EU, according to 
this estimate, the loss in GDP “would be relatively minor, about 0.7 
per cent of GDP.”296  In the words of Gormley, such a scenario 
“would be a hard Brexit on the most disadvantageous terms for all 
parties.”297  Nonetheless, a “no deal” Brexit on WTO terms has 
been vigorously advocated by some prominent British politi-
cians.298  
Such an outcome would leave the UK free to conclude trade 
agreements with other countries and to determine its own tariffs 
and regulations (in accordance with WTO rules).  However, the UK 
would still need to comply with relevant EU laws and regulations 
to be able to export to the EU’s internal market even under the 
WTO framework.299   
In the field of security and defense, “no deal” would mean not 
following up the UK’s ejection from the CFSP/CSDP with a future 
                                                   
294  See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 217, at 75–76 (“Furthermore, the 
WTO option would significantly limit the UK’s access to the services market.”). 
295  CHARLES P. RIES ET AL., RAND EUROPE, AFTER BREXIT ALTERNATE FORMS OF 
BREXIT AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND THE UNITED STATEs xi–xii (2017) (internal footnotes omitted).  This scenario 
does not assume that the UK concludes an FTA with the U.S. 
296  Id. 
297  Laurence W. Gormley, Brexit—Nevermind the Whys and Wherefores? Fog in 
the Channel, Continent Cut off!, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1175, 1206 (2017). 
298  See Iain Duncan Smith, Sorry, Project Fear, We are Not Going to Fall off a 
Cliff-Edge – Britain will Thrive, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/08/15/sorry-project-fear-not-going-
fall-cliff-edge-britain-will/ [https://perma.cc/5WT8-RSNN] (making the case for 
“no deal,” and accepting the terms of the WTO over another deal with the EU).  
299  See CHARLES P. RIES ET AL., supra note 295, at xi (noting that under a “no 
deal” scenario, the “UK would be able to set its own tariffs and establish its own 
regulatory standards, although any divergence from EU standards would increase 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs).”).  
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arrangement to contribute as a third country, such as the frame-
work agreements of Norway and Canada.  However, the UK 
would remain connected to 22 EU Member States via its continued 
NATO membership, and hence indirectly to the EU via EU-NATO 
cooperation (see supra 3.3.2).  
In addition, as these different models reveal, the way security 
and defense cooperation and third country participation are struc-
tured in the EU, this policy domain is far less restrictive than coop-
eration with third countries in trade and regulatory matters.  For 
instance, neither neutrality nor NATO membership preclude con-
tributing to CSDP operations conducted by the EU, nor do they 
preclude (parallel) cooperation on a bilateral basis with individual 
EU members.  The EU’s CFSP/CDSP hardly clouds these relation-
ships.  By contrast, close association with the EU through either a 
customs union or EEA membership puts significant restraints on 
an independent trade policy.  It is here that the shadow of the EU-
Member States side of the triangle looms largest over its relations 
with third countries.  In the case of deep FTAs such as CETA, the 
“right to regulate” applied to both sides of the agreement.  They 
suggest leeway, but at the same time legally cement the need for 
compliance with evolving EU standards to benefit from market ac-
cess under such an FTA.  Thus, the third country still remains in 
the penumbra of the internal market.  This fundamental difference 
between trade and security and the more rigid trade-offs that exist 
in the former field together form key factors in the development of 
the “new transatlantic trigonometry” post-Brexit.  
 
5.  NEW TRANSATLANTIC TRIGONOMETRY 
 
While the previous sections were about the situation pre-Brexit 
and alternative models of association with the EU that exist with 
other countries, the analysis now turns to a future in which the UK 
has ceased to be an EU member.  In particular, it addresses what 
this will entail for legal relations with the U.S.  The good news 
from a transatlantic point of view is that the vast majority of trian-
gular treaty relations the U.S. entertains with the EU and its Mem-
ber States will remain unaffected by Brexit.  However, the EU itself 
did not freeze up in a state of paralysis after the Brexit referendum.  
To the contrary, it has been moving ahead in its external relations, 
both with internal reforms and new approaches to international 
agreements.  This situation represents a double challenge: first, 
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Brexit calls into question the UK’s position regarding the existing 
bilateral and multilateral EU-agreements with the U.S.; second, be-
yond maintaining continuity, future treaty relations between the 
U.S. and UK will be conditioned by the form of the future relation-
ship the latter will have with the EU.  The UK may be out of the 
EU, but the closer an association with the EU it desires, the more it 
will remain part of this triangular relationship when engaging with 
non-EU countries. 
The crux will not necessarily lie in the quantity of agreements 
to be renegotiated here, but in the qualitatively relevant ones.  The 
lesson from the previous sections applies here: It is the economic, 
“low politics” agreements that will be most legally and politically 
challenging, while a transatlantic readjustment in the “high poli-
tics” of security and defense will be a lot more straightforward by 
comparison.  To elaborate on these points, the final section of this 
Article first catches up with the intervening developments in the 
EU and explains their relevance in the transatlantic context (5.1.) 
and addresses important timing issues for the way forward (5.2.).  
Subsequently, it turns to the future of the U.S.-EU-UK triangle, first 
from the point of view of continuity (5.3.) and then moving on to 
future agreements (5.4.). 
5.1.  The EU as a Moving Target 
 
Trade and security not only serve as useful examples for dis-
tinguishing different modes of managing Brexit in the transatlantic 
relationship.  They also showcase the activities undertaken within 
the EU to readjust its foreign relations moving forward.  
That Brexit represented an existential challenge for the EU be-
came clear in the context of the finalization of the EU’s Global 
Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy in June 2016.  The Global 
Strategy, which covers all areas of EU external relations, was ap-
proved only a few days after the EU membership referendum in 
the UK.  Hence, its authors felt compelled to make a direct refer-
ence to it.  In the Strategy’s foreword, High Representative Federi-
ca Mogherini observed that the “purpose, even existence, of our 
Union is being questioned”300 noting that this “is even more true 
after the British referendum.”301  
In the area of trade, the EU has continued to push ahead with 
                                                   
300  SHARED VISION, COMMON ACTION: A STRONGER EUROPE, supra note 55, at 3. 
301  Id. 
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bilateral negotiations with, among others, Canada, Japan, Mer-
cosur, Mexico, and Vietnam.302  The above-mentioned Comprehen-
sive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada was signed in 
October 2016 and is being provisionally applied (supra 4.4.).  Even 
though CETA was hailed as the new “gold standard” of its 
FTAs,303 the protracted ratification process and questions about the 
legality of its Investment Court System has prompted a fine-tuning 
of the EU’s approach to trade agreements elsewhere. 
The clearest manifestation of this new approach is the forth-
coming EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (“EPA”).  Ne-
gotiations on it were finalized in December 2017.  A remarkable 
new feature is the splitting of the originally envisaged EPA into 
two parts—one falling under the EU’s exclusive competence; the 
other including “shared” elements such as investment protection, 
on which negotiations continue.304  This has an important conse-
quence from the point of view of EU foreign relations law: for the 
EU-exclusive agreement, ratification by all Member States can thus 
be avoided. 
From a transatlantic relations perspective, CETA and the EPA 
with Japan send two different signals regarding the prospects of a 
TTIP—or any successor initiative.  On the one hand, if hailing 
CETA as the EU’s new “gold standard” means that it will be the 
substantive baseline for future negotiations, this will make finding 
common ground with the U.S. even harder.  In particular, not only 
the heavily institutionalized Investment Court System,305 but also 
issues such as guaranteeing geographical indications and the open-
                                                   
302  See Jakob Hanke, EU Takes Over Global Trade Stage, POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2017), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-takes-over-global-trade-stage/ 
[https://perma.cc/D7E4-F2RJ] (discussing numerous trade deals the EU is cur-
rently pursuing). 
303  See European Commission Statement 16/446, supra note 273.  
304  See European Commission, EU News 267/2017 Joint Statement by the 
President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker and the Prime Minis-
ter of Japan Shinzo Abe (Dec. 8, 2017), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1768 
[https://perma.cc/MKN2-AKVJ] (noting that negotiations are ongoing). 
305  The U.S. administration is said to be pursuing an aggressive approach 
towards the WTO’s Appellate Body.  See Gregory Schaffer, The Slow Killing of the 
World Trade Organization, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-slow-killing-of-the-world-trade-
organization_us_5a0ccd1de4b03fe7403f82df [https://perma.cc/HCD2-FDQG] 
(detailing the Trump Administration’s plans to effectively destroy the WTO by 
blocking appointments to its Appellate Body, which may reflect a general skepti-
cism towards international adjudicatory bodies with jurisdiction over the U.S.). 
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ing of public procurement markets will be hard to swallow for U.S. 
negotiators.306  
On the other hand, the “splitting” approach as seen in the EPA 
with Japan makes it considerably easier to ratify the EU-exclusive 
agreement on the EU side.  Moreover, it removes the investment 
protection chapter and its institutional architecture, which is still 
politically and legally contentious,307 from the immediate agenda 
for both sides.  In any event, it is unlikely that the U.S., as an eco-
nomic superpower outweighing the EU post-Brexit,308 will keenly 
work from any EU blueprint. 
Turning to security and defense, the EU has made this a priori-
ty area of implementing its 2016 Global Strategy.  Even though the 
UK under the Blair government played a crucial role in unlocking 
the CSDP in the late 1990s (see supra 2.1.), subsequent UK govern-
ments blocked efforts for more integrated structures or institutions 
such as a common operational headquarters.309  However, with the 
withdrawal process officially launched, reforms in EU defense pol-
icy have started to gain traction.310  
                                                   
306  See DANIEL S. HAMILTON, CREATING A NORTH ATLANTIC MARKETPLACE FOR 
JOBS AND GROWTH: THREE PATHS, ONE DETOUR, A U-TURN, AND THE ROAD TO 
NOWHERE 14 (2018) (noting that “Washington was unwilling (and largely unable) 
to open public procurement, or compromise on geographical indications, two 
primary goals for the Europeans.”). 
307  See Robert W. Schwieder, TTIP and the Investment Court System: A New 
(and Improved) Paradigm for Investor-State Adjudication, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
178, 226 (2016) (discussing the different critiques on investor-state dispute settle-
ment and concluding that although “incorporating an updated and reformed 
ISDS system into the TTIP agreement theoretically presents the best available al-
ternative to the current regime, only a miraculous shift in public perception 
would render that option practicable”).  See also, HAMILTON, supra note 306, at 14. 
308  See Josh Zumbrum, Brexit Will Put the U.S. Back atop the World GDP Rank-
ings, WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 29, 2016), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/06/29/brexit-will-put-the-u-s-back-
atop-the-world-gdp-rankings/ [https://perma.cc/62DL-DGYJ] (discussing the 
macroeconomic consequences and concomitant effects on EU-U.S. trade negotia-
tions of Brexit). 
309  See Hajnalka Vincze, The Transatlantic Dimension of Euroscepticism, in THE 
UK CHALLENGE TO EUROPEANIZATION: THE PERSISTENCE OF BRITISH EUROSCEPTICISM 
232, 240–41 (Karine Tournier-Sol & Chris Gifford eds., 2015) (discussing UK oppo-
sition to integration with EU security and defense initiatives).  This opposition al-
so continued after the Brexit referendum.  See also Andrew Rettmann, UK Blocks 
Blueprint for EU Military HQ, EU OBSERVER (May 16, 2017), 
https://euobserver.com/foreign/137916 [https://perma.cc/DKG8-SFES] (dis-
cussing the UK’s efforts to block the establishment of an EU military headquarters 
after the Brexit vote). 
310  Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Implementing 
the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence, Brussels, Nov. 14, 
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Three developments are illustrative of this trend.  First, a “Mili-
tary Planning and Conduct Capability”—an EU headquarters but 
only for “non-executive” missions, i.e., those concerned with train-
ing—was established in June 2017.311  Second, the European Com-
mission successfully initiated a new “European Defence Fund” to 
the order of 5.5 billion euros per year.312  This initiative is relevant 
in that it starts to blur the line between the supranational and in-
tergovernmental modes of operation in EU external relations by 
giving defense a more prominent role in the regular EU budget.313  
This entails more involvement of the European Parliament and 
Commission,314 which are traditionally structurally sidelined in the 
CFSP/CSDP.  Moreover, it moves the EU towards becoming a 
closer and more active military procurement market, which should 
be of economic interest to U.S. defense industry and, hence, also 
the U.S. government’s trade policy. 
Third, a framework called “Permanent Structured Coopera-
tion” (PESCO) has been activated.  Provided for in the EU Treaties 
following the Lisbon reform,315 the provisions on PESCO laid 
dormant for eight years.  In late 2017, it was officially launched.316  
It allows a group of Member States to work together more closely 
                                                                                                                   
2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22459/eugs-conclusions-
st14149en16.pdf) [https://perma.cc/QS36-G7LX]. 
311  Council Decision (EU) 2017/971 of 8 June 2017 determining the planning 
and conduct arrangements for EU non-executive military CSDP missions and 
amending Decisions 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to con-
tribute to the training of Somali security forces, 2013/34/CFSP on a European Un-
ion military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian armed forces 
(EUTM Mali) and (CFSP) 2016/610 on a European Union CSDP military training 
mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA), 2018 O.J. (L 146) 133. 
312  European Commission, Press Release IP/17/1508, A European Defence 
Fund: €5.5 Billion per Year to Boost Europe’s Defence Capabilities (June 7, 2017). 
313  Id. (“The Fund will create incentives for Member States to cooperate on 
joint development and the acquisition of defence equipment and technology 
through co-financing from the EU budget and practical support from the Com-
mission.”). 
314  See TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 314 (establishing the involvement of the 
Commission, Council, and Parliament in the adoption of the EU’s annual budget).  
See also supra 2.3. 
315  See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 46; see also TEU, supra note 28, Protocol No. 
10 (discussing permanent structured cooperation established by Article 42 of the 
Treaty on European Union, attached to the EU Treaties). 
316  See Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the 
Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Secu-
rity Policy, Nov. 13, 2017, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HV8G-F56D] (announcing the initiation of PESCO).  
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in the creation of military capabilities and their deployment in or-
der to conduct “the most demanding missions.”317  Among the 25 
PESCO countries, voting requirements on certain matters switches 
from unanimity to qualified majority.318  Hence deviation—though 
a slight one—from the intergovernmental mode of operation can 
be seen here as well.  All EU Member States except Denmark, Mal-
ta, and the UK take part in PESCO.319  Since the latter is assumed to 
be leaving the EU, it did not sign up.320 
A way back in for the UK is that PESCO allows for third-
country participation.  However, interested third countries “would 
need to provide substantial added value to the project, contribute 
to strengthening PESCO and the CSDP, and meet more demanding 
commitments.”321  As is the case with contributing to CSDP opera-
tions, the EU “will not grant decision powers to such Third States 
in the governance of PESCO.”322  Admission to PESCO will be 
granted by the Council “in PESCO format” after checking “if the 
conditions set out in the general arrangements are met.”323  If ad-
mitted, “the participating Member States taking part in a project 
may enter into administrative arrangements with the third State 
concerned.”324  Hence, next to a framework agreement for the UK’s 
participation in PESCO, there would be additional “soft” agree-
ments between the UK and EU countries that take part  in PESCO. 
From a transatlantic perspective, this would in theory also al-
low the U.S. to take part in PESCO.  However, for the time being 
PESCO as well as the European Defence Fund should be seen from 
the perspective of EU-NATO relations.  Both have the potential to 
                                                   
317  TEU, supra note 28, at art. 42, ¶ 6. 
318  See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 46, ¶ 2 (concerning the establishment of 
PESCO); see also, TEU, supra note 28, art. 46, ¶ 3 (concerning the admission of 
Member States to PESCO at a later stage); see TEU, supra note 28, at art. 46, ¶ 4 
(concerning the suspension of underperforming participating Member States). 
319  See Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017, 2017 O.J. (L 
331) 57, art. 2 (establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and de-
termining the list of participating Member States). 
320  See Andrea Shalal & Robert Emmott, EU to Sign Joint Defense Pact in Show 
of post-Brexit Unity, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
eu-defence/eu-to-sign-joint-defense-pact-in-show-of-post-brexit-unity-
idUSKBN1D81CT [https://perma.cc/U9SW-9E2U] (“But it was clear that Britain, 
which intends to leave the bloc following the Brexit referendum of June 2016, 
would not participate, officials said.”).  
321  See Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, supra note 319, Annex III, pt. 2.2.1. 
322  Id. 
323  Id. 
324  Id., art. 9, ¶ 3. 
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be seen as tangible steps towards increased and more efficient de-
fense spending among European NATO members, a contentious 
point highlighted by the current administration.325  At the same 
time, none of these initiatives have a direct, legally relevant impact 
on NATO, although better EU-NATO cooperation has been ex-
horted as desirable by the leadership of both organizations.326 
Across different policies, the EU is changing its approach to-
wards external relations.  These changes affect both the procedures 
for, and content of, international treaties with third countries going 
forward, including with the U.S. and the post-Brexit UK. 
 
5.2.  Timing Issues 
 
Before turning to the substantive issues of (re-)negotiating trea-
ties with the U.S., two preliminary points need to be made concern-
ing timing.  Firstly, as long as the UK remains a member of the EU, 
it will be covered by, and bound by, the treaties that the EU con-
cludes.327 
Once the UK ceases to be an EU member, it may enter a transi-
tional phase with the EU.  Such an arrangement has been flagged 
as desirable by the UK government.328  Also, the EU has indicated 
                                                   
325  See Peter Baker, Trump Says NATO Allies Don’t Pay Their Share. Is That 
True?, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/world/europe/nato-trump-
spending.html [https://perma.cc/NJ7U-Z8JF] (discussing President Trump’s 
claim that European NATO members are failing to contribute enough to defense 
spending). 
326  See, e.g., the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, 
the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Warsaw, July 8, 2016, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31947/st14802en17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TDY5-2S8S] (committing “to give new impetus and new sub-
stance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership”).  See also Council of the European 
Union, Council Conclusions on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration by the 
President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission 
and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, 
Dec. 5, 2017 (announcing the intention of the European Union, European Com-
mission, and NATO to enhance strategic cooperation on security and defense). 
327  See TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 216, ¶ 2 (“Agreements concluded by the 
Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States.”). 
328  See Prime Minister’s Office, PM’s Florence speech: A New Era of Cooper-
ation and Partnership between the UK and the EU (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-
cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu 
[https://perma.cc/3XZX-JED2] (suggesting “an implementation period of around 
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an interest for a transition period, though under the premise that 
“the United Kingdom will continue to participate in the Customs 
Union and the Single Market (with all four freedoms) during the 
transition.”329  This arrangement would entail, among other things, 
that the UK “will have to continue to comply with EU trade poli-
cy” and apply the EU’s customs tariffs.330  According to the sup-
plementary negotiating directives of January 2018, moreover, “the 
United Kingdom should remain bound by the obligations stem-
ming from” EU agreements but will “no longer participate in any 
bodies set up by those agreements.”331  
Nevertheless, from a transatlantic perspective, any transitional 
arrangement is an agreement between the EU and UK, and thus, 
res inter alios acta as far as the U.S. is concerned.  The EU and UK 
cannot together agree that the UK will emerge as a new quasi-
party to existing EU treaties with third countries where the UK 
was not a party before (i.e., non-mixed agreements, supra 3.2.).  
Such “roll-over” during the transition would require the consent of 
the other parties,332 including the U.S., in each case, following the 
logic of the law of treaties discussed below.  With the presumptive 
Brexit date of March 29, 2019 looming, this leaves relatively little 
time for preparing the negotiation of such consent with the United 
States and others.  Nevertheless, assuming the transition is limited 
in time and will not become entirely open-ended, this is likely to 
raise the chances for approval from the American side.  The U.S. 
may then save its demands for concessions and adaptations for the 
post-transition period. 
The approaching Brexit deadline leads to the second prelimi-
nary point, i.e., the question of when the UK can start negotiating 
new treaties with the U.S., either to replace existing ones (post-
transition) or to tread new ground.  Politically, it would make 
sense for the UK to commence as soon as possible, even while it is 
                                                                                                                   
two years.”). 
329  European Council, supra note 42, at 2. 
330  Id. 
331  Council of the European Union, supra note 44, at pt. 15.  See also Draft 
Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom, supra note 45, at art. 129, 
¶¶ 1–2. 
332  Ramses A. Wessel, Consequences of Brexit for International Agreements Con-
cluded by the EU and its Member States, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 101, 116 (2018) 
(noting that the UK “may in some cases aim at what could largely be a copy of the 
agreements that were concluded by the EU.  This, of course, assumes that the oth-
er contracting parties would agree to such a solution.  In fact, this should not be 
taken as a given.”). 
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still an EU member.  However, legally, the UK is barred from nego-
tiating international agreements on its own in cases where they 
touch upon EU exclusive competences, where EU rules may be af-
fected, or where the “duty of sincere cooperation” might be violat-
ed (supra 3.3.).  Here, the triangular relationship comes to the fore 
again, as the UK remains conditioned in its international dealing 
until the end of its EU membership.  During a transition period, 
this side of the triangle would change in nature from EU law to in-
ternational law.  Nonetheless, significant restrictions are likely to 
apply then as well.  According to the supplementary EU directives, 
the UK “may not become bound by international agreements en-
tered into in its own capacity in the fields of competence of Union 
law, unless authorized to do so by the Union.”333  However, at least 
this opens the possibility for the UK to start negotiations during 
the transition.  In October 2017, the UK government had acknowl-
edged that it “would not bring into effect any new arrangements 
with third countries which were not consistent with the terms of 
[its transitional] agreement with the EU.”334 
It would be legally possible, and politically advisable, for the 
EU to authorize the UK to start negotiations with third countries as 
soon as possible,335 definitely during the transition.  While still an 
EU member, the UK government has been careful to brand its talks 
with third parties as “preliminary discussions” rather than negotia-
tions.336  With the United States in particular, it has set up a “trade 
and investment working group.”337  A core task of this group’s 
work will be to ensure the continuity of treaty relations and ex-
plore future agreements.  As its name suggests, the focus is on eco-
nomic issues rather than security and defense. 
 
                                                   
333  See Council of the European Union, supra note 44, at pt. 16.  See also Draft 
Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom, supra note 45, at art. 129, ¶ 
4. 
334  UK DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, PREPARING FOR OUR FUTURE 
UK TRADE POLICY, 2017, Cm. 9470, at 28. 
335  Thomas Streinz, Cooperative Brexit: Giving back Control over Trade Policy, 15 
INT’L J. CONST’L L. 271, 284–87 (2017); see also TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 2, ¶ 1. 
336  Theresa May: UK will Lead World in Free Trade, BBC (Sept. 7, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37291832 [https://perma.cc/K4PS-
TDX4]. 
337  UK DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, US-UK TRADE WORKING GROUP 
LAYS GROUNDWORK FOR POTENTIAL FUTURE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/us-uk-trade-working-group-lays-
groundwork-for-potential-future-free-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc/ZN6R-
EBSY]. 
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5.3.  Ensuring Continuity in Treaty Relationships 
 
There are various parallel ongoing developments in the transat-
lantic triangle, i.e., Brexit negotiations, EU reforms, as well as a 
generally perceived unpredictability of the new U.S. administra-
tion.338  Hence, a legal analysis on the way forward needs to start 
with the issue of ensuring “continuity” of existing relationships 
despite the potential for disruption inherent in the UK’s withdraw-
al from the EU.  The focus will be on the post-transitional period, 
though it should be noted that also for the continuing application 
of EU-agreements with the U.S. during a transition phase, the lat-
ter’s consent would be needed.  First, bilateral agreements will be 
discussed, followed by the multilateral ones.  Within each category 
it makes sense to distinguish again between non-mixed and mixed 
agreements. 
“Continuity” of existing agreements has been noted as an ob-
jective of the UK government.339  As to what it means by “rolling 
over” existing agreements concluded by the EU beyond a transi-
tion period, domestic discussion for a new “Trade Bill” provides 
some clarification.340  According to a House of Commons briefing 
paper, “[i]nstead of seeking to become a party to existing EU trade 
agreements in the long term (sometimes called ‘trilateralisation’), 
the Government’s approach is to negotiate new bilateral agree-
ments with the third countries that are ‘substantively the same or 
as similar as possible.’”341  This may be an optimistic assessment, 
particularly when dealing with the United States. 
In the case of the U.S., there is no existing comprehensive bilat-
eral trade agreement given the freezing of TTIP negotiations.  Nev-
ertheless, many of the approximately 50 bilateral agreements in 
                                                   
338  See, e.g., Keren Yarhi-Milo, After Credibility: American Foreign Policy in the 
Trump Era, 97 FOREIGN AFF. 68, 72 (2018) (“Yet the president’s track record of flip-
flopping on key campaign pledges, his bizarre and inaccurate outbursts on Twit-
ter, his exaggerated threats, and his off-the-cuff assurances have all led observers 
to seriously doubt his words.”). 
339  UK DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 334, at 28 (“The 
UK Government is committed to seeking continuity in its current trade and in-
vestment relationships, including those covered by EU third country FTAs and 
other EU preferential arrangements.”). 
340  Lorna Booth et al., The Trade Bill, House of Commons Library Briefing Pa-
per (July 2, 2018), at 31 (explaining that the new legislation is to give “the Gov-
ernment powers to change domestic legislation to ensure that any such ‘transi-
tioned’ trade agreements can be implemented.”). 
341  Id. at 29–30. 
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force between the EU and U.S. have a trade or trade-related di-
mension,342 and hence would need to be replicated.343  Moreover, 
there are several other agreements, beyond the scope of the “Trade 
Bill”, including in the field of security, where there is little clarity 
about whether they are to be “rolled over” or not.344  Yet in other 
cases, such as air transport, “suspended” agreements may reacti-
vate themselves even though they might be outdated.345 
From a UK foreign relations law point of view, the conclusion 
of “roll over” agreements is fairly uncontroversial for three rea-
sons.  First, the UK is already complying with them while still an 
EU member.  Second, treaties are made by the British government 
under the “royal prerogative,” leaving Parliament only limited 
powers of prior scrutiny.346  Third, government powers for ensur-
ing continuity are further bolstered through special legislation, 
such as the above-mentioned Trade Bill.  However, there are possi-
ble hurdles on the U.S. side. 
The EU-only bilateral agreements in force with the U.S. cease to 
apply to the UK post-Brexit.347  Hence, “roll-over” is a somewhat 
euphemistic term, describing what under the international law of 
treaties amounts to the conclusion of new agreements with the U.S.  
Neither the replication of the content in the new agreement nor the 
other party’s consent can be presumed, the latter being regulated 
by American foreign relations law.  This required, in any event, the 
President’s approval.348  Depending on the subject matter, it will 
                                                   
342  Agreement between the United States of America and the European 
Community on Trade in Wine, U.S.-EU, Mar. 10, 2006, T.I.A.S. 05-1123.   
343  E.g., Agreement between the Government of the United States of America 
and the European Union on the Coordination of Energy-Efficiency Labelling Pro-
grams for Office Equipment, U.S.-EU, Jan. 18, 2013, T.I.A.S. 13-220. 
344  For instance, there exists a U.S.-UK agreement in parallel to the U.S.-EU 
one.  See Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-UK-N. Ir., Jan. 6, 1994, T.I.A.S. 
96-1202 (rendering, potentially, the replication of the EU-U.S. agreement unneces-
sary). 
345  Agreement on Air Transport Services, supra note 204 (showing that the 
suspended U.S.-UK Agreement on North Atlantic Air Fares stems from 1978). 
346  See Miller, supra note 35, at ¶¶ 54–58 (summarizing the UK’s dualist sys-
tem, with reference to case law and convention).  See also CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 129 (2014) (concluding that “the process of negotiation, 
conclusion and signature of treaties remains with the executive, as indeed does 
their ratification on the international place.”). 
347  See e.g., Odermatt, supra note 49, at 1056; Łazowski & Wessel, supra note 
47, at 13. 
348  Some agreements may be, and increasingly are, concluded as executive 
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also require different forms of Congressional involvement.349  From 
a continuity point of view, a logical starting point for procedural 
clarity is, hence, to check under which procedure in U.S. law rele-
vant agreements were concluded with the EU in the first place. 
Moreover, the case of dealing with the U.S. might be distin-
guished from most of the many dozen continuity negotiations that 
await the post-Brexit UK.  On the one hand, there is the oft-
invoked “special relationship,”350 which may imply a degree of 
goodwill towards the UK.  On the other, any “special relationship” 
bonus may be mitigated by several factors.  In contrast to smaller, 
especially developing countries, the United States has the adminis-
trative capacity, negotiating experience, and considerable econom-
ic and political leverage to check closely whether it is in the coun-
try’s interest to simply “roll over” an agreement, or whether its 
content should be adapted given the new political and economic 
reality.  Most importantly, the contracting party is no longer the 
whole EU and its internal market, but one country with an econo-
my—though sizeable—amounting to one sixth of the EU’s gross 
domestic product (GDP).351  In particular, this would involve 
checking whether any concessions were given to the EU at the 
time, which would no longer seem merited vis-à-vis the UK.352  
Such an approach would be consistent with the current administra-
                                                                                                                   
agreements by the President alone.  See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over 
International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L. J. 140, 205 (2009) (arguing that 
the “twentieth century saw the emergence and eventual triumph of presidential 
unilateralism over international lawmaking.”). 
349  See text and references supra note 53. 
350  See Highlights: President Trump News Conference with UK Prime Minister 
May, RTÉ (last updated July 13, 2018), 
https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2018/0713/978496-donald-trump-presser/ 
[https://perma.cc/AU5Z-XLA3] (noting that the President said, “I would say I 
would give our relationship in terms of grade the highest level of special.”).  But 
see Jeffrey A. Stacey, The Hollowing Out of the Special Relationship: The Bleak Future of 
the U.S.-British Alliance, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-09-05/hollowing-out-special-
relationship [https://perma.cc/UV57-HVM5] (noting the deteriorating nature of 
the UK U.S. relationship). 
351  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROSTAT, SHARE OF MEMBER STATES IN EU GDP 
(Apr. 10, 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-
/DDN-20170410-1 [https://perma.cc/JR9A-DZU8] (noting that the UK accounts 
for 16 percent of the EU’s GDP). 
352  Wessel, supra note 332, at 15 (stressing that the other party’s consent to 
copy-paste an agreement “should not be taken as a given” and that “in some cases 
copy-pasting existing agreements to make them adjusted for the United Kingdom 
would be less easy than it sounds as many of the provisions were tailor-made for 
the EU-situation”). 
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tion’s “America First” approach to foreign policy and treaty-
making.353 
In the mixed-bilateral setting, which only concerns one agree-
ment that is in force in the case of the U.S., the UK’s case for conti-
nuity is somewhat stronger.  Alongside the EU, it is one of the par-
ties.  This might seem to favor its continued status as a party post-
Brexit.  However, here it is “essential to recall that these are not just 
international agreements that the UK entered into individually,”354 
but as an EU Member State.  Hence, mixed agreements are still bi-
lateral in nature, with the U.S. being a party “of the one part”, and 
the EU and its Member States concluding it “of the other part”.355  
Institutionally, moreover, mixed agreements reflect this bilateral 
nature.  For instance, in CETA, a joint committee that consists of 
“representatives of the European Union and representatives of 
Canada,” will be “co-chaired by the Minister for International 
Trade of Canada and the Member of the European Commission re-
sponsible for Trade, or their respective designees.”356  Keeping the 
UK in “would change the nature of a bilateral agreement to a mul-
tilateral agreement.”357  
Therefore, it cannot be assumed the UK will remain a party 
once it is no longer an EU Member State.  As a consequence, “tri-
lateralizing” erstwhile bilateral mixed agreements requires renego-
tiation of the text, necessitating the consent of the other parties.  In 
the case of the 2004 Galileo/GPS Agreement, its institutional setup 
is less complex than CETA.  Nonetheless, the “bilateral” nature of 
the agreements is apparent here, too.  For instance, it provides that 
for consultations in the context of dispute settlement that, 
“[r]epresentatives of the Council of the European Union and the 
European Commission, of the one part, and of the United States, of 
the other part, shall meet as needed.”358  The agreement clarifies, 
                                                   
353  See the President’s preface to the NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 
55, at i (observing an “America First foreign policy in action”, which puts an em-
phasis on “enforcing our borders, building trade relationships based on fairness 
and reciprocity, and defending America’s sovereignty without apology.”). 
354  See Wessel, supra note 332, at 17.  See also Odermatt, supra note 49, at 1059–
60. 
355  See Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS 
Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications, supra note 79 (using 
the formulation “of the one part”/“of the other part” at its outset). 
356  CETA, supra note 108, at art. 26.1.1. 
357  Wessel, supra note 332, at 20. 
358  See Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS 
satellite-based navigation systems, supra note 79, at art. 17, ¶ 2. 
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moreover, that “‘the Parties’ shall mean the European Community 
or its Member States or the European Community and its Member 
States, within their respective areas of competence, on the one 
hand, and the United States, on the other.”359  It does not envisage 
non-EU third countries as members.  
Alternatively, the UK could accept ceasing to be a party to this 
mixed agreement by officially withdrawing from it, or simply ac-
quiescing into being ejected from it, and instead renegotiate a bilat-
eral agreement with the U.S.  However, since the agreement con-
cerns an EU project, administered by the European Space Agency 
(ESA), the UK’s stake and position remain unclear.360 
In the multilateral setting, the distinction between mixed and 
non-mixed needs to be kept in mind as well.  The added difficulty 
in maintaining continuity here stems from the possible need for 
consent, not just from the U.S., but also the other parties.  In the 
non-mixed category, the 2005 Agreement on Duty-Free Treatment 
of Multi-Chip Integrated Circuits (MCPs) serves as a rare multilat-
eral example involving both the EU and the U.S. but not the Mem-
ber States.  The UK has never been a party in its own right, and 
hence could not lay claim to such status post-Brexit.  Hence, its op-
tions are to either conclude a bilateral agreement with the U.S. (and 
possibly others) to that effect or join the multilateral agreement.  
The latter is legally easy to achieve since the existing members 
cannot veto acceptance in this particular case.361 
The multilateral, mixed category is legally a more complex set-
ting.  However, in terms of retaining membership, the UK’s posi-
tion is much stronger here.  In the case of the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the UK is a party in its own right 
alongside the EU since 2012.362  Prominent examples of interna-
tional organizations with mixed membership include the WTO and 
                                                   
359  Id. at art. 18.  The agreement refers to the European Community because 
it was concluded before the Lisbon Treaty created the EU as a single legal person.  
See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 1, ¶ 3 (“The Union shall replace and succeed the Eu-
ropean Community.”). 
360  ESA is not an EU agency but a separate intergovernmental organization, 
of which the UK is a member.  See Framework Agreement between the European 
Community and the European Space Agency, EU-ESA, Nov. 25, 2003, 2004 O.J. (L 
261) 64 (establishing a framework for cooperation between the EU and the ESA). 
361  Agreement on Duty-Free Treatment of Multi-Chip Integrated Circuits 
(MCPs), supra note 167, at art. 7, lit. b (“This Agreement shall be open for ac-
ceptance by any Member of the WTO.”).  The UK’s membership of the WTO post-
Brexit is not disputed. 
362  Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, supra note 160. 
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Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).  In these two exam-
ples, the UK is a founding member, as is the U.S.  Moreover, in 
contrast to the bilateral mixed treaties, the UK is not only a party 
by virtue of being an EU country, but at least partially in its own 
right.  This makes continued membership the presumption.  As 
confirmed in CJEU case law and “declarations of competence” is-
sued in these multilateral settings, EU Member States also exercise 
their own competences in these organizations,363 though their free-
dom of action is restricted by EU law (supra 3.3.).  Post-Brexit—or 
at least post-transition—these constraints will fall away.  At the 
same time, “the UK will become responsible for the implementa-
tion of all provisions,” including those that used to be covered by 
the EU.364  
Nevertheless, continuity of membership does not equate conti-
nuity of terms of membership.  Consequently “the UK’s continued 
participation may become subject to negotiations between the EU, 
its Member States and third countries (including the UK in a new 
special position).”365  In the case of the WTO, negotiations with af-
fected WTO members may be necessary for agreeing on the UK’s 
future tariff schedules and for the splitting up of the tariff rate quo-
tas between it and the EU.  Nonetheless, these will not affect the 
UK’s status as a WTO member as such.366 
It should be recalled, furthermore, that in more security-
                                                   
363  See Opinion 1/94, supra note 205, at ¶ 105; see also Case C-240/09, 
Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej 
republiky, 2011 E.C.R. I-01255, ¶ 31. See also Andrés Delgado Casteleiro, EU Decla-
rations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: A Useful Reference Base?, 17 EUR. 
FOREIGN AFF. REV. 491, 492 (2012) (observing that issuing declarations of compe-
tence has become a common practice as “an attempt to apportion the responsibili-
ties within a multilateral agreement based on who has competence (the EU 
and/or its Member States) over the issue covered by the specific provisions of the 
multilateral agreement”). 
364  Wessel, supra note 332, at 21. 
365  Id.; see also Peter Ungphakorn, Nothing Simple About UK regaining WTO 
Status post-Brexit, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.ictsd.org/opinion/nothing-simple-about-uk-regaining-wto-status-
post-brexit [https://perma.cc/GHZ9-LKK6]; Aakanksha Mishra, A Post Brexit UK 
in the WTO: The UK’s New GATT Tariff Schedule, in GETTING TO BREXIT: LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF THE PROCESS OF THE UK’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EU 9, 9 (Jennifer A. 
Hillman & Gary Horlick eds., 2017) (“There are certain ways by which the UK 
could establish itself as a WTO member in its own right.  However, each approach 
is fraught with a set of complexities.”). 
366  Lorand Bartels, The UK’s Status in the WTO Post-Brexit, in THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND THE FEDERAL IDEA 227, 229–32 (Robert Schütze & Stephen Tierney 
eds., 2018) (detailing the UK’s status as an original member of the WTO with full 
rights and responsibilities). 
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oriented organizations such as the UN and NATO, the UK is a 
member but not the EU (supra 3.3.2.).  Hence, Brexit’s impact on its 
continued status alongside the U.S. will be very limited, and also 
because EU powers and obligations of “sincere cooperation” in the 
security and defense field are already less invasive while being an 
EU member.367  This again reveals that the real difficulty in “trans-
atlantic trigonometry” is in the allegedly “low politics”, not the 
“high politics” of security and defense, both in the bilateral and 
multilateral sphere, for both existing and future agreements.  
 
5.4.  Parameters for New Agreements 
 
Beyond ensuring continuity by finding replacements for EU 
agreements, the UK will be freer post-Brexit—or in any event post-
transition—to conclude new treaties with external partners.  Given 
the “special relationship” with the UK, the U.S. would be a logical 
priority in such endeavors.  However, the influence of the EU will 
be felt even after the UK ceases to be an EU country, the extent of 
which will be contingent on the future shape of the UK-EU-side of 
the transatlantic triangle. 
From a policy perspective, going beyond continuity fits the 
theme of Global Britain as outlined in government papers, accord-
ing to which the “UK intends to pursue new trade negotiations to 
secure greater access to overseas markets for UK goods exports.”368  
This appears to be indeed the primary focus of Global Britain, while 
in security and defense matters the UK seeks close alignment with 
the EU post-Brexit and continued reliance on NATO.369 
This means that advances in post-Brexit bilateral U.S.-UK 
transatlantic relations are likely to focus primarily on trade issues.  
With no TTIP in existence that could be “rolled over”, the UK 
would have to negotiate a trade agreement with the U.S. from 
scratch.  A new free trade agreement with the U.S. has been floated 
ever since the referendum,370 with one of the stated aims of the UK-
                                                   
367  Larik, supra note 191, at 187–89 (describing the limited legal effects of loy-
alty obligations in the CFSP). 
368  UK DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 334, at 29. 
369  See HM GOVERNMENT, FOREIGN POLICY, DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT: A 
FUTURE PARTNERSHIP PAPER 19 (Sept. 12, 2017) (stating that “NATO will continue 
to be the cornerstone of our security and the UK will continue to champion and 
drive forward greater cooperation between the EU and NATO …”). 
370  See, e.g., Benjamin Oreskes & Victoria Guida, The Bright Side of Brexit? A 
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U.S. Trade and Investment Working Group being “to lay the 
groundwork for a potential, future free trade agreement once the 
UK has left the EU.”371  
Such a new free trade agreement would be an example for the 
new nature of the transatlantic treaty triangle.  The UK-EU side of it 
would no longer be governed by EU law and its “constitutional” 
features.372  Hence, the international legal nature of all three sides 
of this new trade triangle would be the same in nature, i.e., public 
international law, possibly specified in the form of treaties.  All this 
may imply a large degree of freedom and flexibility, but several 
economic, political and legal constraints apply. 
In principle, post-Brexit and transition, the UK could even con-
clude a trade agreement with the U.S. before it does so with the 
EU.  However, there will be what could be termed a pull towards 
“implicit sequencing” in negotiations in the transatlantic triangle, 
as opposed to the “explicit sequencing” of withdrawal negotiations 
(supra 2.2.).  The main reason for this is the current economic reali-
ty that “[t]he UK exports almost half of its goods and services to 
the EU—twice as much as to the U.S.”373  According to the study 
conducted by RAND Europe, a scenario in which the UK and U.S. 
would conclude an FTA, but in which the EU would have FTAs 
with neither, would benefit the UK to some extent, yet “still be less 
beneficial than an FTA with the EU.”374 
Hence, the shape and content of the future UK-EU trade rela-
tionship will continue to loom over the UK-U.S. side even post-
Brexit, meaning that there is an incentive for the UK to clarify first 
the future EU-UK trading relationship before finalizing the UK-
U.S. one.  Having a clearer idea of the basis for negotiating a U.S.-
UK FTA makes sense also from a U.S. point of view.  As noted by 
Hamilton, “[b]efore Washington begins to negotiate a formal bilat-
eral deal with the UK, it will want to understand … London’s end 
goals with regard to a deal with the EU.”375 
It is at this point that the different models of association with 
                                                                                                                   
U.S.-UK Trade Deal, POLITICO (June 24, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/brexit-us-britain-trade-deal-224776 
[https://perma.cc/623Z-92DY] (reporting on the likelihood of a new two-way 
trade deal between the U.S. and the UK). 
371  UK DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 337. 
372  See Kadi v. Council, supra note 77, at ¶ 281. 
373  HAMILTON & QUINLAN, supra note 8, at 2. 
374  RIES ET AL., supra note 295, at 86. 
375  HAMILTON, supra note 306, at 43. 
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the EU and their transatlantic implications come to the fore (supra 
4.).  Depending how deep and specifically regulated this relation-
ship will be, it will have varying degrees of impact on the UK’s 
ability to strike a trade agreement with the U.S.  For instance, a 
Norway-type (EEA) or Swiss-type (set of bilateral agreements) ar-
rangement will continue to hamper its freedom to maneuver and 
to make concessions on regulatory issues that would deviate from 
the acquis of EU law even beyond any transitional period.  Similar-
ly, a Turkey-style customs union hampers its ability to provide tar-
iff concessions (in the areas covered by the customs union), and in 
fact commit it to follow the EU’s lead in trade policy. 
From the British Government’s official pronouncements to 
date, neither of these more restrictive models involving a customs 
unions or Norway or Swiss-style single market access is likely.376  
Instead, a CETA-style agreement, i.e., a deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreement potentially fleshed out with some form of 
customs facilitation and free trade in goods in exchange for align-
ment with relevant EU regulations, appears to be the landing zone. 
With regards to the U.S., the CETA-model would provide the 
UK with maneuvering space in terms of tariffs and regulation, at 
least legally speaking.  A “right to regulate”377 inherent in such a 
kind of FTA could come to be used as a “right to deregulate” or a 
“right to diverge” from EU standards to accommodate U.S. inter-
ests.  This may be necessary to make such a deal attractive to the 
U.S. in the first place. 
 In terms of political economy, Britain will be the smaller 
market facing an assertive “America First” approach.  According to 
RAND Europe, the sobering assessment is that “an FTA with the 
UK would be of negligible macroeconomic benefit”378 to the U.S.  
Hence, the latter can be expected to seek additional concessions to 
make such a bilateral FTA worthwhile. On the one hand, “[s]ome 
issues may be less difficult in U.S.-UK negotiations than they were 
in TTIP, for instance, the EU’s insistence on ‘cultural exceptions’ or 
geographic indications.”379  On the other hand, important obstacles 
remain.  Agriculture, for instance, could become a sensitive issue 
politically, given that British farmers may not be “keen on a trade 
                                                   
376  See supra note 217 (providing official statements of the UK government’s 
stance on the future relationship between the UK and the EU).  
377  See CETA, supra note 108, at 8. 
378  RIES ET AL., supra note 295, at 86. 
379  HAMILTON, supra note 306, at 44. 
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deal that would open them up to U.S. competition at the very time 
they are losing generous EU subsidies.”380  Moreover, issues that 
already troubled the TTIP negotiations, such as food and animal 
standards, like the infamous “chlorine chicken”, will resurface in 
the context of a U.S.-UK FTA.381  Other likely contentious points 
are public procurement and sensitive domestic areas such as 
healthcare.382 
The UK may want to acquiesce to some of the American de-
mands in order to have a deal, if only for political window dress-
ing.  Nevertheless, even if accommodating U.S. interests (and thus 
ensuring U.S. constitutional hurdles will be met more easily), the 
UK remains constrained by two more factors.  The first is UK do-
mestic politics and the UK’s “foreign relations law.”  Given wide 
discretion of the government due to the “royal prerogative” in 
treaty-making, it is legally largely unencumbered, though unlike 
situations that concern “continuity” that are about the status quo 
and are covered by enabling legislation such as the Trade Bill (su-
pra 4.3.), it could face fiercer political opposition and subsequent 
problems when it comes to implementation by Parliament.383 
The second is EU law regulating access to the internal market, 
under the penumbra of which the UK remains, which brings out 
once more the triangular nature of the transatlantic relationship 
post-Brexit.  This puts the British government in a difficult posi-
tion.  On the one hand, the closer the UK stays aligned with EU 
regulations, the less maneuvering space it has for accommodating 
U.S. interests.  On the other hand, UK producers and service pro-
viders would still need to comply with relevant EU rules if they 
want to fully benefit from a new CETA-style UK-EU FTA, in addi-
tion to undergoing customs and rules of origin checks that will 
have to be introduced.  If British products do not meet EU safety 
standards or content requirements to qualify for the benefits under 
a future FTA, they will not be able to receive the preferential 
treatment granted by the agreement.  In such a scenario, according 
                                                   
380  Id. at 45. 
381  Richard Partington, Trump Adviser Ross says UK-US Trade Deal will mean 
Scrapping EU Rules, GUARDIAN, Nov. 6, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/nov/06/trump-ross-says-uk-us-
trade-deal-eu-brexit-chlorinated-chicken [https://perma.cc/55AP-6T5Y] (warn-
ing that any post-Brexit deal with the U.S. will depend on the UK discarding rules 
set by Brussels). 
382  HAMILTON, supra note 306, at 45 (noting that other market access issues 
may arise due to the UK’s concern regarding certain U.S. restrictions on trade). 
383  See generally supra note 346. 
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to the so-called “Brussels effect,” even with the UK no longer being 
in the EU, adapting to the latter’s generally stricter regulations 
would allow British businesses to trade on both sides of the Atlan-
tic,384 rather than having to choose one over the other. 
An even more ambitious model for future transatlantic trade 
relations is a trilateral, revamped (and possibly renamed) TTIP-
style agreement.  The parties to such an agreement would be the 
UK, the EU (and possibly the Member States), and the U.S.  Ac-
cording to the RAND Europe report, this would be the economical-
ly most advantageous scenario for all sides.385  Legally and politi-
cally, however, such an agreement will be extremely difficult to 
realize.  Turning already troubled TTIP talks into three-way nego-
tiations including the UK following an acrimonious Brexit process 
does not create a promising starting point.  Moreover, it would re-
quire, among other things, an institutional redesign of the agree-
ment into a “trilateral” relationship.  A Joint Committee would 
have to include members from all three sides.  In addition, all three 
would have to have a say in appointing and selecting members of 
inter-party and possibly investor-state dispute settlement bodies.386  
A more realistic—though still more long-term scenario—is that of 
working incrementally towards a more open and better coordinat-
ed “North Atlantic Marketplace” in a way that avoids past pitfalls 
and dead ends.387  
In the multilateral sphere, not much new is to be expected.  In 
contrast to the continuity scenario, this would entail the U.S. and 
UK joining or creating new multilateral treaties and organizations.  
Global Britain certainly professes a multilateral dimension.388  How-
ever, this is not reciprocated by the current U.S. administration, 
                                                   
384  Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (“Trading 
with the EU requires foreign companies to adjust their conduct or production to 
EU standards—which often represent the most stringent standards—or else forgo 
the EU market entirely.”). 
385  RIES ET AL., supra note 295, at 57–58 and 67 (contending that the largest po-
tential gains for all three partners would arise from this scenario). 
386  See generally supra note 357. 
387  HAMILTON, supra note 306, at 22–24 (explaining the potential benefits of a 
North Atlantic Marketplace). 
388  See HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 369, at 2 (“The UK will also continue to . 
. . be a champion of the UN and multilateralism . . . ”).  See also, UK DEPARTMENT 
FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 334, at 25 (“Already a champion of multilat-
eral trade from within the EU, the UK is preparing to take on an even greater role 
in the WTO outside the EU …”); Political Declaration Setting out the Framework 
for the Future Relationship, supra note 45, at pt. 6 (“The Parties also reaffirm their 
commitment to promoting effective multilateralism.”). 
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which has shown a preference for bilateral rather than multilateral 
approaches.389  Examples include the “unsigning” of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership390 and withdrawing from the Paris Climate Ac-
cord, the Iran Nuclear Deal, and the UN Human Rights Council.391 
In the security and defense field, the limited impetus of Brexit 
for new transatlantic multilateral approaches will become evident.  
The UK’s NATO membership will remain unaffected, while the 
British government has expressed a preference for very close asso-
ciation with the EU’s CSDP.  It offered the EU “a future relation-
ship that is deeper than any current third country partnership,” 
which should be “unprecedented in its breadth, taking in coopera-
tion on foreign policy, defence and security, and development.”392  
As seen above, there exist already facilities for third country con-
tributions, contingent on EU approval, that could form the basis for 
such a partnership, and which are not mutually exclusive with 
NATO and bilateral UK-U.S. cooperation (supra 5.1.). 
Third-country associations with the EU’s CSDP would also 
lead to an “open triangle” involving the U.S. and UK as external 
contributors.  As noted above, the U.S. already has such an ar-
rangement in place (supra 3.2.1.).  The UK could either replicate 
this or seek a more enhanced form of association, as expressed in 
its “future partnership paper,” including third-country association 
with the newly activated PESCO (supra 5.1.).  Consequently, the 
U.S. and UK could find themselves both contributing to certain EU 
missions in the future, when they decide to do so.  However, given 
that third-country participation in such missions needs to respect 
                                                   
389  See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 TRADE POLICY 
AGENDA AND 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (Mar. 2017) (noting that U.S. trade policy 
goals “can be best accomplished by focusing on bilateral negotiations rather than 
multilateral negotiations …”). 
390  Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s Signature 
Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y9T4-8CC7]. 
391  See Joris Larik, The EU’s Global Strategy, Brexit and “America First”, 23 EUR. 
FOREIGN AFF. REV. 343, 361–62 (2018) (summarizing the international legal com-
mitments from which the U.S. has withdrawn under the Trump Administration).  
See also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2018) (providing an extensive account and critique of the Trump Admin-
istration’s approach to international law). 
392  HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 369, at 18. See also Political Declaration Set-
ting out the Framework for the Future Relationship, supra note 45, pt. 80 (“With a 
view to Europe’s security and the safety of their respective citizens, the Parties 
should establish a broad, comprehensive and balanced security partnership.”). 
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the “decision-making autonomy” of the EU,393 the triangular rela-
tionship framed by the CSDP would be lopsided towards the latter. 
Lastly, apart from new international agreements and treaty-
based organizations, more flexible forms of collaboration are avail-
able.  For instance, recalling the Iran Nuclear Deal and its 
“P5+1”/“E3+3” format,394 such approaches are easily adaptable to 
the post-Brexit world.  Institutionally, it would mean that the UK 
continues to take part in this grouping, but henceforth in its own 
right completely, whereas France and Germany continue to see 
their participation in part, as an exercise of the Union’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.  In short, formats such as “E3+3” 
would simply become “E2+4”—or “E2+3” in case the U.S. refrains 
from taking part.  
In sum, the new treaty arrangements post-Brexit in the transat-
lantic tringle will be mostly focused on trade and regulation, where 
there exist important and visible trade-offs and costs.  Adaptation 
in the security and defense field will be easier, at least as far as le-
gal arrangements are concerned and as long as interests converge.  
In both fields, it is unlikely to see the new triangular relationship 
cast in the form of trilateral treaties, be it a three-way TTIP or secu-
rity arrangement.  Instead, from the point of view of international 
law, such triangles will more likely manifest themselves as sets of 
partially co-dependent bilateral agreements. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
This article illustrated how Brexit is not only a cause for up-
heaval in the UK and the EU, but also for relations with the U.S.  
Having traced the developments leading up to the UK officially 
negotiating its withdrawal from the bloc, and having scrutinized 
the legal relations as they currently stand, the alternative models 
that exist, and finally the possible ways forward for the UK, U.S. 
and EU, three main conclusions can be drawn.  
First, the transatlantic impact of Brexit is in the first place an 
empirical challenge.  Beyond a general sense that the UK will have 
to renegotiate numerous international agreements with its part-
ners, closer analysis of databases and compendia reveals that it is 
not always clear what is exactly at stake.  However, there are two 
                                                   
393  See supra note 138. 
394  See Harnisch, supra note, at 160. 
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consoling factors.  The existing treaty relations between the U.S. 
and the EU and its (remaining) Member States remain in place, as 
will existing bilateral U.S.-UK treaties.  In addition, the number of 
agreements to be replicated by the UK is manageable—at least for 
the U.S., which only has to go through this exercise once.  Never-
theless, there is no time to be wasted for preparing replication and 
renegotiation in order to avoid unforeseen effects and protracted 
legal uncertainty. 
Second, coping with the transatlantic fallout of Brexit requires 
doctrinal clarity about the nature of the relations at stake.  Hence, 
this Article argued that transatlantic treaty relations need to be un-
derstood as both triangular and multilevel.  Failing to understand 
the importance of how the foreign relations laws of the U.S., the 
UK, and the EU and its remaining Member States means failing to 
appreciate how the nature and content of different international 
agreements affect their chances of successful negotiation, ratifica-
tion, and implementation by the different actors in the transatlantic 
space.  These relationships, moreover, are interdependent, making 
their recalibration an exercise of “transatlantic trigonometry.”  In 
particular, the close ties that EU membership exerts on its Member 
States, and any form of close association the UK might have with 
the EU in the future, will continue to loom large. 
Third, achieving a “kinder, gentler Brexit”395 in the transatlantic 
context is a political challenge with many moving parts.  Not only 
are the governments in the U.S. and UK implementing their respec-
tive visions of “America First” and Global Britain, but also the EU 
has been propelled on a course of reform and activism.  While the 
near-term will be about continuity, fitting the different pieces of 
the transatlantic space back together is neither impossible nor an 
inevitability.  Legally, upsetting existing relationships can be min-
imized, though it will be a matter of negotiations and hence come 
with adjustments based on the shifted power relations.  In an effort 
to “take back control” from the EU, to use the favorite slogan of the 
Leave-campaign and Brexiteers,396 the UK is in fact on a course to 
handing control over many international engagements to its exter-
nal partners, whose consent will be required in many instances for 
continuing existing agreements and for putting in place new ones.  
Avoiding disruption—perhaps counterintuitively—has been 
shown to be easier, legally and politically, in the “sovereignty sen-
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396  ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 65. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2
 
2018] The New Transatlantic Trigonometry 81 
sitive” fields of security and defense, while deeper integration and 
more apparent trade-offs in the trade and regulatory sphere turn 
the latter into the principal arena for a drawn-out struggle for the 
shape of future relations. 
Two hundred and twenty-two years ago, George Washington 
used his farewell address to caution his fellow citizens against “in-
terweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, [as this 
would] entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European 
ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice[.]”397  To some, Brex-
it may be seen as European “rivalship” and “caprice” par excellence 
and proof of the first President’s considerable prescience.  None-
theless, in view of the many hundreds of treaties that link the two 
sides of the Atlantic together, and in view of the immense trade 
flows, as well as enduring political and personal connections be-
tween them, entanglement is a reality in law and fact.  Hence, for 
the sake of the future of the transatlantic relationship, now is not 
the time—to use Washington’s words once more—to show “infi-
delity to existing engagements” but to recall that “[h]armony, lib-
eral intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, hu-
manity, and interest.”398  
 
                                                   
397  WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL ADDRESS 1796, AVALON PROJECT, 
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